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ABSTRACT
This study has a threefold purpose. Its first objective is to investigate input and 
output efficiencies in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. Its second 
objective is to understand the impact of size, property share, loan production, debt ratio, 
property and geographic diversification, control and governance variables, overall risk, 
capital risk, growth rate, and management type on a number o f  efficiency measures, 
including profit, cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency. The third 
objective is to assess the impact o f structural and regulatory changes in the industry on 
REITs’ productivity, technology, and efficiency changes.
I have estimated the REITs’ efficiency in the period 1989-1999 by employing a 
nonparametric approach, namely Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), along with a 
parametric approach, the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Results suggest that the 
average efficiency for all indexes is very low, implying waste o f  REIT resources and 
potential profits. Results also indicate that the dominant source o f  inefficiency in REIT 
industry is due to technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency. Pure technical 
inefficiency is generally larger than the scale inefficiency, suggesting that the dominant 
source o f overall technical inefficiency is mainly due to pure technical inefficiency.
Several conclusions emerge from second stage regression analysis, which 
examines the efficiency variations. First, robust capitalization and higher loan production 
bear a positive relation to REITs’ efficiency. Second, the growth rate in their assets
iii
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impacts positively on cost, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies, but negatively 
on profit efficiency. Third, REITs with more market power (higher property share) 
experience lower cost, technical, scale, and profit efficiencies. In addition, REIT 
efficiency decreases with higher debt. Finally, those REITs having separate management 
(decision) and board (control) structures are more efficient than those REITs with the 
same management and board.
I also examined the REITs’ productivity change relative to both fixed reference 
technology and successive reference technology. The results suggest that REIT efficiency 
increases due to both scale efficiencies and better management practices; whereas their 
productivity generally decreases because o f  experiencing technical regress. I conclude 
that greater efficiency and technical improvement could both be achieved by the adoption 
o f  appropriate regulations.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were established by the U.S. Congress in 
1960 to allow small investors to participate in diversified, large-scale, income-producing 
real estate enterprises. They are corporations or business trusts managed by boards o f 
directors or trustees. Their shares must be fully transferable, and a minimum one 
hundred. REITs must have no more than 50% o f the shares held by five or fewer 
individuals during the last half o f each taxable year, and at least 75% o f their gross 
income must be derived from real property rents or real estate mortgage interest. They 
also must invest at least 75% o f their assets in real estate equities, mortgages or 
government equities, and pay dividends on at least 90% o f  their taxable income. REITs 
are exempted from both corporate and shareholder level taxation by complying with these 
restrictions.
REITs have received increased attention in the financial literature due in part to 
their unique characteristics and increasing popularity among investors. Investors may 
easily include real-estate-related assets in their investment portfolio by using REITs. An 
explosion o f REIT activity has occurred in the last decade, and REITs have raised 
substantial amounts o f capital for acquiring existing properties and also financing the 
development o f new properties. They have also become a major source of funding for the 
real estate industry by the rapid increase in their security offerings. According to National
I
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2Association o f  Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT), the number of equity REITs 
rose from 56 to 158, and the total market capitalization has increased from $6.8 billion to 
$134 billion during the period 1989-2000. Operational environment changes and 
regulatory shifts in the industry have also impacted on the REIT growth. While the 
average annual number of equity REITs between 1989-1992 was 72.3, the average grew 
to 166 in the period 1993-2000. Accordingly, average market capitalization for the period 
of 1993-2000 increased more than 11 times that o f  the preceding four years. There is a 
52% and 30% increase in initial public offerings by equity REITs in the same two 
periods. The total dollar value o f 318 REIT equity offerings (initial and secondary) 
during 1997 was approximately $32.6 billion.
Along with these tremendous changes in the industry, REITs have also been 
subject to regulatory processes from time to time in the last decade. The Tax Reform Act 
o f 1986, the Revenue Consolidation Act o f  1993, the REIT Simplification Act o f 1997, 
and more recently the REIT Modernization Act in 1999 affected all parties including 
managers, investment companies, shareholders, and the industry in general. For example, 
REITs were given permission not only to own but also to operate and manage properties, 
which in turn generated a new stream o f income for their shareholders, better quality 
controls over the services rendered to tenants, and a more competitive market. Allowing 
institutional beneficiaries to be considered as individual REIT shareholders enhances the 
depth o f potential REIT capital. Reducing the dividend requirement from 95% to 90% 
provides REITs with an additional source o f  income to make payments on outstanding 
debt.
Not only the REITs but other types o f  financial institutions have also experienced 
dramatic operational environment changes over the past several decades. These
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3considerable changes have attracted the attention o f regulators, managers, investors and 
researchers. They are all interested in how efficiently a firm uses its expensive inputs to 
produce its financial products and services. When financial institutions are run 
efficiently, the improvement in resource allocation benefits the whole society by leading 
to improved profitability, greater amounts o f  funds intermediated, better service for 
consumers, and greater safety and soundness in the financial system.
In an increasingly competitive environment, managers should be more concerned 
with how efficiently they operate their firms. Otherwise, the capital market penalizes 
inefficient firms by depressing their share price and subjecting them to takeover. In a 
perfectly competitive market, under-performing firms face difficulties to survive at all, 
and ultimately are driven out by more efficient ones.
There are several techniques for calculating the efficiency measures. Until 
recently, a few REIT efficiency studies focused on how well REITs utilized cost 
advantages stemming from the scale o f production. Scale efficiency refers to whether a 
REIT is operating at the optimal scale—that is, whether a REIT is providing the most 
cost-efficient level o f outputs. Scope efficiency, on the other hand, refers to whether a 
REIT is producing the most cost-efficient combination of products. However, the focus 
has recently switched to another aspect o f  efficiency, which is called X-efflciency. It 
measures how close an observed REIT is to an estimated “best-practice” frontier. While 
scale and scope efficiencies concern a REIT’s choice of outputs, the frontier X-efficiency 
concerns a REIT’s use o f  inputs. For a given level and mix of outputs, if  a REIT does not 
produce its outputs in the least cost way possible, it is either wasting some of the inputs 
(technical inefficiency), or it is using the wrong combination o f inputs to produce its 
outputs given their input prices (allocative inefficiency), or both o f these.
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4Frontier (X-efficiency) analysis provides valuable information for decision 
makers. Numerical efficiency scoring and ranking o f  firms are o f great value because 
they can be used either to:
1) Inform policy-makers by investigating the impact of deregulation, financial 
distress, mergers and acquisitions, or market structure on efficiency;
2) Examine research issues by describing the efficiency o f an industry, ranking 
its firms, or checking how measured efficiency may be related to the different 
efficiency techniques used; or
3) Improve managerial performance by identifying “best performing units” and 
“worst performing units” within an industry or a firm, and encouraging the 
“best practices” common in efficient units while discouraging the “worst 
practices” common in inefficient units.
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) call for financial institution efficiency 
research, and suggest that results from these studies might explain the impact o f various 
regulatory policies on institutional efficiency. In their international survey, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) review 130 frontier (X-) efficiency studies on managerial efficiency of 
different financial institutions such as banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and 
insurance companies. However, they report that most o f these studies have concentrated 
on banking industries in developed countries, suggesting that much more research for 
measuring and comparing efficiency of other financial institutions is called for.
It would be worthwhile to extensively analyze and study the efficiency and 
productivity o f  REITs. In the first stage analysis, five different efficiency measures are 
calculated employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). These are cost efficiency (CE), 
the proportional reduction in costs that can be attained if the REIT is both allocatively
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5and technically efficient; allocative efficiency (AE), the proportional reduction in costs if 
the REIT chooses the right mix o f  inputs given the prices; technical efficiency (TE), the 
proportional reduction in input usage that can be obtained if  the REIT operates on the 
efficient frontier; pure technical efficiency (PTE), proportional reduction in input usage if 
inputs are not wasted; and scale efficiency, or proportional reduction if  the REIT achieves 
constant returns to scale. This study also employs the stochastic (economic) frontier 
approach (SFA) to measure nonstandard (alternative) profit efficiency, which accounts 
for output side errors. Following the studies o f Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Berger and 
Mester (1997) and DeYoung and Hasan (1998), nonstandard (alternative) profit 
efficiency (PE) is defined as how close a firm is to generating maximum profits given its 
output levels.
After recovering the efficiency scores from both DEA and SFA analyses, the 
following variables are used to explain variations in efficiency across REITs in the 
second stage regression analysis. The ultimate goal o f this analysis is to assess how 
specific variables impact on the REITs’ efficiency. These variables are grouped in the 
following categories:
1.1 Size
In the X-efficiency literature, it is typically argued that firm size should be 
strongly associated with efficiency. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991), for example, argue 
that larger firms are likely to have more professional management teams and/or might be 
more cost conscious, due to greater pressure from shareholders concerning bottom line 
profits. Because REITs must pay dividends o f at least 90 percent of their taxable income, 
management teams face considerable pressure from owners. On the other hand, Berger et
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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al. (1993) note that larger firms’ ability to achieve optimal output is a matter o f gaining 
size and achieving higher profits over a period o f decades, an achievement that cannot be 
realized by small firms in the short run. However, efficiency might lead to larger size in 
the sense that more efficient firms compete more effectively and therefore become larger.
Although the direction o f  size and efficiency is not clear, it seems that the 
proposed relationship between size and X-efificiency in the literature is not negative. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses can be stated:
H0: REIT size is not positively related to X-efficiency,
Ha: REIT size is positively related to X-efficiency.
1.2 Property Share
Competitive pressure is one o f the most important factors in enhancing a firm’s 
efficiency within an environment characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric 
information (Hayek, 1945; Hart, 1983). The market power hypothesis states that firms in 
less competitive markets can charge higher prices for their services and eventually make 
supernormal profits, and consequently are likely to feel less pressure to control their costs 
and enjoy a “quiet life”. Therefore, the market power hypothesis suggests that the 
following null hypothesis will be rejected:
H0: Market power is not negatively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency, 
Ha: Market power is negatively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency.
On the other hand, the efficient structure hypothesis posited by Demsetz (1973), 
Peltzman (1977) and Gale and Branch (1982), among others, states that efficient firms 
compete more aggressively, generate higher profits, and gain larger market shares due to 
their low costs of production. Thus, the efficient structure hypothesis suggests that the 
following null hypothesis will be rejected:
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7Ho: Market power is not positively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency, 
Ha: Market power is positively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency. 
Because a great proportion o f equity REITs’ income comes from properties, this study 
captures some aspects o f  market power with the ratio o f REIT properties to the total 
properties for each year.
1.3 Loan Production
The composition o f a REIT’s portfolio influences operating costs and in turn may 
well determine operating efficiency. Since equity REITs might provide loans o f up to 
25% of their portfolio, it is worthwhile seeing whether there is an association between 
efficiency and loan production.
1.4 Debt Ratio
In their economies of scale estimation, Bers and Springer (1998a) report that the 
average scale economy o f low-Ieverage REITs is much higher than that o f  high-leverage 
REITs. This result implies that low-leverage REITs acquire more benefit from increasing 
size than do high-leverage ones. Additionally, REITs using more debt incur greater 
financial risk and consequently the cost o f  their debt might be more than low-leverage 
REITs, for a given size. In their DEA analyses, Anderson et al. (1999) find a negative or 
insignificant relationship between debt ratio and operating efficiency. Thus, the following 
null hypothesis is expected to be rejected:
H0: Debt ratio is not negatively related to X-efficiency,
Ha: Debt ratio is negatively related to X-efficiency.
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1.5 Concentration
REITs can be classified based on the type o f property in which they concentrate 
their investment, and can also be divided by regions. To account for property-type 
diversification and geographical-region investment differences across REITs, related 
Hirschman-Herfindahl indices can be used to examine the impact o f  property and 
geographic diversification on REIT efficiency. More diversified REITs require highly 
skilled management teams knowledgeable about the industry, and are likely to incur more 
operating costs. Therefore, diversification is expected to be negatively related to 
efficiency, leading to the following null hypothesis:
Ho: More diversified REITs are not less X-efficient,
Ha: More diversified REITs are less X-efficient.
1.6 Corporate Governance and Control
Agency problems cause inefficient firm behavior. Separation o f decision 
management from decision control is one way to alleviate possible agency problems 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). CEOs have the most power in the decision management
process in terms o f preparation and implementation o f projects. The board o f  directors is
generally responsible for the greatest decision control, such as approving investments and 
monitoring implementation. Pi and Timme (1983) state that when the CEO is also the 
Chairman o f the Board, decision management and control of the firm would be one- 
handed, and therefore the principal-agent problem may get worse. In all probability such 
a firm is more likely to be run inefficiently. The agency theory suggests the rejection of 
the following null hypotheses:
H0: CEO-Chairman affiliation is not negatively related to X-efficiency,
Ha: CEO-Chairman affiliation is negatively related to X-efficiency.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.7 Overall Risk
If  REITs are trading off risk against return, riskier REITs may be more profit 
efficient. Furthermore, efficient REITs might be good at risk management, suggesting 
also a negative relationship between cost efficiency and risk. Standard deviation o f return 
on assets (ROA) is used to measure the risk. The following null hypothesis should be 
rejected:
Ho.‘ REIT risk is not negatively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency,
Ha: REIT risk is negatively (positively) related to cost (profit) efficiency.
1.8 Capital Risk
Capital risk (the ratio o f equity to total assets) is the probability o f  becoming 
insolvent. A REIT with more equity is able to take on more and cheaper debt with less 
chance of becoming insolvent. In the literature, well-capitalized firms are found to be 
more efficient which is consistent with the moral hazard theory. The theory states that 
managers with less capital to lose can take on riskier projects, and not necessarily pay 
attention to efficiency. Another possible reason is that efficient firms have higher profits, 
which might lead to a higher equity-total assets ratio. Therefore, the following alternative 
hypothesis should be accepted:
Ho: Well-capitalized REITs are not more X-efficient,
Ha: Well-capitalized REITs are more X-efficient.
1.9 Growth
The level o f  growth rate (change in total assets) is a managerial decision about 
future investments. Especially after 1994, the focus o f REITs shifted to secondary 
offerings, with more than S7 billion raised in 1995, SI I billion in 1996, $26 billion in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1997, and S19 billion during 1998. The number o f  offerings increased from 52 in 1994 to 
297 in 1998. Many firms might outgrow their current level o f  management skills because 
they may not immediately react to changing market conditions, and may make non- 
optimal decisions, causing inefficient operations. REITs’ management teams should have 
enough expertise and skill to overcome all operational details.
1.10 Type of Management
There are two forms o f management in REITs, self-managed and externally 
managed firms. Self-managed REITs use their own employees to manage the assets and 
investments. A third party or a REIT affiliate management firm performs these services 
for externally managed REITs. By realizing the profit potential in the self-management o f  
the operation, recent trends in the industry indicate that REITs are moving towards 
internal management, suggesting an increase in operational efficiency (Anderson et al., 
1999). Therefore, the following null hypothesis is expected to be rejected:
H0: Self-managed REITs are not positively related to X-efficiency,
Ha: Self-managed REITs are positively related to X-efficiency.
This study also examines the impact o f regulatory and structural changes in the 
industry on REITs’ productivity, technology, and efficiency by employing the DEA-type 
Malmquist total productivity index method. This method allows not only analysis o f  
changes in efficiency among REITs but also changes in technology. It also provides the 
sources of efficiency change; namely, either change in technical efficiency or change in 
scale efficiency.
This study contributes to the extant literature in several respects. First, this is the 
first attempt to measure the efficiencies o f equity REITs by applying more than one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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method to the same data set. Second, five different measures o f  nonstochastic efficiency 
scores and stochastic alternative profit efficiency are estimated. This study is also the first 
study to predict and analyze the profit efficiency, cost efficiency, and allocative 
efficiency o f REITs. Third, in addition to size, management type, diversification and 
leverage variables, this study investigates the impact o f market power, risk, growth, and 
control and governance variables on REIT efficiencies. Additionally, this study examines 
the REITs’ total factor productivity change for the last decade to detect any improvement 
in performance after regulatory and structural changes. Finally, the study assesses 
possible efficiency change sources, such as pure technical efficiency change (change in 
managerial efficiency) and scale efficiency change (change in optimal size).
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CHAPTER 2
TECHNICAL AND SCALE EFFICIENCIES OF REAL 
ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITs)
2.1 Introduction
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and other types o f financial institutions 
have experienced considerable operational environment changes over the past several 
decades. This process is largely the result o f legislation, structural change, technological 
progress and consolidations. These dramatic changes have attracted the attention of 
regulators, managers, investors and researchers who are interested in the impact on 
operational efficiency. Efficient institutions, in terms of their sources (inputs) and funds 
(outputs), have better service, higher profits, and more funds, which, in turn, benefit 
society.
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) call for financial institution efficiency 
research, and suggest that results from these studies might explain the impact of various 
regulatory policies on institutional efficiency. In their international survey, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) review 130 frontier (X-) efficiency studies on managerial efficiency of 
different financial institutions such as banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and 
insurance companies. However, they report that most of these studies have concentrated 
on the banking industry in developed countries, suggesting much more research is needed 
for measuring and comparing efficiency o f other financial institutions.
12
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The Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry has experienced considerable 
legal and structural changes during the last two decades. The U.S. Congress created 
REITs in 1960 to enable small investors to make an investment in a diversified, large- 
scale, income-producing real estate enterprise. REITs have experienced regulatory 
changes, most notably in 1976, 1986, 1993, 1997, and 1999, allowing them to exercise 
their business plans and operating systems with more efficiency.
Initially, REITs were subject to a 90% ordinary income distribution test, i.e., they 
had to distribute 90% of their taxable income to shareholders. This requirement was 
increased to 95% in January 1, 1980. Until 1986, REITs were required by federal law to 
hire a manager to operate their properties. Because managers have different economic 
interests than REIT owners, this situation has created agency problems [see Schulkin, 
1971] and affects investment performance [see Solt and Miller, 1995, Hsieh and Sirmans, 
1991, Howe and Shilling, 1990]. The Tax Reform Act o f  1986 gave REITs permission to 
own, operate and manage most commercial properties. The Revenue Reconciliation Act 
o f 1993 allowed pension funds to make large dollar investment in REITs, and with the 
REIT Simplification Act o f 1997, their operations were further simplified by the U.S. 
Congress. Finally, the REIT Modernization Act (RMA), effective in 2001, was signed on 
December 17, 1999. One o f the most important features o f the RMA is to reduce the 
dividend requirement to 90%, providing a valuable source of after-tax incomes to make 
payments on outstanding debt.
Although REITs have existed in an environment with intense regulation changes, 
there has been no inquiry into the efficiency o f  REITs, and its implications.1. The purpose 
o f this study is to investigate the efficiency o f  REITs, and to examine the relationship
1 The only exception is perhaps an unpublished working paper by Anderson et al. (1999).
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between the characteristics and efficiency o f REITs. Frontier techniques have been used 
in order to estimate the efficiency o f  firms over the past four decades. These techniques 
are grouped under parametric and nonparametric approaches which entail econometric 
and mathematical programming methods. Some studies compared different techniques 
and reported a strong relationship between the findings. (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; 
Eisenbeis, Ferrier and Kwan, 1996). However, policy and research issues may be more 
convincing if several frontier techniques are applied to the same set o f data to 
demonstrate the robustness o f  the results from both the first and second stage analyses 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
the parametric Stochastic (Economic) Frontier Approach (SFA) are used to investigate 
the cost and profit efficiencies o f  REITs. In the SFA, only profit efficiency was 
calculated due to a data-fitting problem.
Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3 presents the methodology and 
data. Section 4 reports efficiency measures in general and examines the relationship 
between efficiency and REIT characteristics. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Review of the Relevant Literature
The Real Estate literature lacks thorough efficiency analyses. However, there are 
some economies o f scale studies with mixed results. Allen and Sirman (1987) are the first 
to examine merger and acquisitions o f REITs. They investigate the acquiring firm’s stock 
price reaction to merger proposals when both parties are REITs over the period 1977- 
1983. They find a wealth increase for acquiring REITs, which is attributed to better asset 
utilization, suggesting scale economies. McIntosh et al. (1991) examine the relationship 
between REIT size and stock price performance over the period 1974-1988. They find
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that smaller REITs have higher returns during the subperiod 1974-1978 and over the 
entire time period from 1974 to 1988, contradicting the existence o f REIT scale 
economies.
Another issue is the shareholders’ wealth effect of transactions involving the sale 
or purchase o f real property and real estate operating entities. Glascock el al. (1991) finds 
that both buyer and seller have significant transaction gains, without identifying the 
source o f  these gains. McIntosh et al. (1995) extend the research by assessing the real 
property transactions of tax qualified REITs between 1968 and 1990 to determine 
shareholder wealth effects. They find that certain REITs experience positive results upon 
the announcement of sale transactions. Positive price impact for REIT sell-off indicates 
that there are benefits associated with reductions in size, suggesting additional evidence 
against scale economies.
The REIT industry experienced a consolidation process in the 1990s. Some 
observers argue that the number o f REITs will diminish and the average REIT size will 
increase through an ongoing process o f  mergers and acquisitions, and that there must be a 
motivating factor such as the presence o f  economies o f scale and efficiency gains. 
Linneman (1997) suggests that REITs will continue to grow in size and scale as they 
fully integrate the advantage of capital access, permanent lower capital costs and 
economies o f  scale over the long run. Linneman claims that REITs will be able to operate 
their properties at a lower cost because o f their buying power, management infrastructure, 
and low overhead. Their overall cost o f  capital is at least 100 basis points lower than the 
competition because of their access to capital markets, and skill at financial structuring. 
These advantages will drive their competitors out of business. Hence, merger activity is 
expected to continue, resulting in domination by a very small number o f giant REITs.
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Vogel (1997) counters these views and argues that the consolidation process is 
based on external, not efficiency related, factors. The argument is made through analogy. 
I f  there is a competitive advantage, it lies in management rather than ownership. There is 
not enough evidence that size gives REITs an operating advantage. He also gives a few 
examples o f fluctuation in the cost o f capital from the 1980s, and claims that the cost of 
capital has no permanent trend. Instead, it depends on the economy, yield curve, or 
investors’ perception about real estate market changes.
Campbell et al., (1998) examine merger activity in the period 1994-1998 to 
evaluate how each o f the above arguments is supported. The population includes 27 
mergers in which both the acquirer and the target firms are equity REITs. They measure 
trading volume responses and price responses by using event study methodology. The 
results indicate that returns for REIT acquirers are usually negative, and acquired REITs 
underperform, compared to their non-REIT counterparts. They conclude that if  REIT 
mergers are value enhancing, acquiring firm managers have generally failed to capture 
the enhancements for their shareholders, suggesting the possible presence o f self-dealing 
in many o f these mergers. Furthermore, disappointing gains for acquired firms might 
dampen enthusiasm for mergers among owners o f potential merger targets, and thus 
make it more difficult for REIT consolidation to occur. They also note that no hostile 
takeovers occurred during the period, and that most mergers produced either negative or 
comparably low returns, suggesting that systematic structural problems might prevent 
widespread consolidation.
An article by Ambrose et al. (2000) studies whether or not there are consolidation 
gains due to economies o f scale. Their final sample includes 21 multifamily equity REITs 
covering the years 1994-1997. To analyze economies o f scale, they compare each REIT’s
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net operating income (NOI) growth rate in gross number o f  units to the NOI growth rate 
for its shadow portfolio, controlling for management ability. The results do not support 
the hypothesis that large REITs are able to achieve economies o f  scale through 
controlling expenses because the efficiency gains come primarily from rental growth 
rather than through expense control. They conclude that REIT consolidation will not 
result from cost economies. Furthermore, they find no evidence that REITs engaged in 
active branding programs generate higher NOI growth, and that geographic concentration 
generates NOI growth.
Capozza and Seguin (1998) decompose general and administrative (G&A) 
expenses into a nondiscretionary “structural” component and a discretionary or “style” 
component to examine the effect o f managerial style on firm value. The structural 
component is associated with the costs o f assets and liability management, while style 
component is, among other things, related to expenses diversifying the portfolio. They 
study 32 equity REITs with 416 potential observations from 1985 to 1992. The results 
suggest that greater diversification is associated with higher G&A expenses, and that the 
nondiscretionary component o f  G&A expenses increases with size at a decreasing rate, 
which suggests economies o f scale.
Bers and Springer’s (1997) study measures economies of scale using translog
9
methodology. Their sample includes 85 observations from 1992, 113 from 1993, and 146 
from 1994. Scale economy measures represent the percentage change in input (expenses) 
associated with a percentage change in output (average total assets and dividends). The 
authors use the sum o f interest expenses, operating expenses, general and administrative 
expenses, and management fees as inputs while they use total assets and dividends as 
outputs in the translog cost model. One-output (total assets) and two-output (total assets
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and dividends) translog models produce similar results. This similarity implies that the 
total asset effect is the dominant determinant o f  the overall scale economy measure in the 
two-output model. The results suggest that economies of scale exist for the REIT industry 
but decrease with firm size. They conclude that there is an optimal size for REIT cost 
efficiency because o f  diminishing and subsequently disappearing scale economies. 
However, optimal size depends on individual REIT characteristics, and is not feasible 
because o f changing the estimated scale economies over time.
Bers and Springer (1998a) extend their research to identify the sources of scale 
economies. The potential sources are general and administrative (G&A) expenses, 
management fees, operating expenses, interest expense, and interest expense as a 
percentage o f total liabilities. The sample consists of all publicly traded REITs for the 
years 1992 through 1996, and include from 303 to 631 observations, depending on the 
cost category. Cost categories analyses show that except for interest expense, all 
categories o f costs exhibit scale economies, and that G&A expenses are the largest. 
Although the next-largest source is management fees, operating expenses are not an 
important economies of scale source. They conclude that G&A expenses and 
management fees are the more reliable sources o f scale economies, and provide the best 
target for cost control and improved operating efficiency for REITs expanding through 
merger and acquisition.
As a further extension, Bers and Springer (1988b) classify the REITs according to 
five attributes: the type of property management, the degree o f investment in mortgages, 
financial leverage, diversification across property types and the property type, and 
examine differences in scale economies for the 1992 to 1997 time period. The complete 
data set is comprised of 1274 observations from 345 REITs. The subsamples used to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
estimate the impact o f various REIT characteristics on scale economy range from 62 to 
711 observations. The translog cost model methodology follows Bers and Springer 
(1998a). The model is estimated separately for each REIT types. They find that externally 
managed REITs experience higher scale economies than self managed REITs. This 
implies that external management passes some o f  the benefits o f scale efficiencies on to 
the REIT. Estimated scale economies are larger for mortgage REITs which have 
relatively more administrative costs than equity REITs. Low leverage and well- 
diversified REITs show larger scale economies than more leveraged and specialized 
REITs, respectively. Finally, industrial REITs appear to have more scale economies.
Anderson et al. (1999) employ a linear-programming technique, Data 
Envelopment Analyses, to measure scale and technical efficiency o f REITs for the period 
o f  1992-1996. Equity REITs have overall efficiency measures ranging from 44% to 66%. 
Hybrid REITs ranging from 72% to 84% are more efficient. Consistent with Bers and 
Springer (1997, 1998a,b), most of the REITs are found to be operating at increasing 
returns to scale in which their efficiency ranges from 74% to 83%. The second stage 
regression results indicate that debt is negatively related to both overall efficiency and 
pure technical efficiency between 1992 and 1995. However, there is a positive 
relationship between debt ratio and scale efficiency in 1994, 1995, and 1996. The authors 
find mixed results for diversified REITs, and conclude that REIT concentration increases 
efficiency by allowing more effective input utilization, but reduces the ability to take 
advantage o f scale economies. Finally, internally managed and large REITs appear to be 
more efficient.
The results o f these economies o f scale and efficiency studies are derived 
bycomparing inputs (proxied by costs) to outputs (total assets), and assuming that a REIT
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is a real estate investment. However, there is an implicit problem in choosing the output 
measures because REITs are also considered as equity and their value changes frequently 
in the market. In this case, market capitalization seems to be an appropriate output 
measure. However, Springer (1998) argues that there are drawbacks to these output 
measures (total assets and market capitalization). The primary criticism for total assets is 
that they do not represent current measures because they are presented on a cost basis. 
They may also include additional costs with the purchase o f  properties. Market 
capitalization, on the other hand, is not a constant measure, and changes over time. 
Therefore, it is difficult to measure market capitalization appropriately. Furthermore, it 
does not reflect what REITs are paying for their properties, but what investors are paying 
for stock.
There has been considerable debate as to whether REITs are stock investments or 
real estate investments, with mixed findings. Giliberto and Mengden (1996) compare the 
performance o f  REIT (public) and unsecuritized (private) real estate investment 
performance using the National Association o f Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
Equity REIT Index and the National Council o f  Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries 
(NCREIF) Property Index (NPI), respectively. They find that private and public market 
real estate cash flows are strongly positively correlated, implying that the performance of 
the underlying real estate assets in publicly traded equity REITs is not fundamentally 
different from the performance of direct real estate. The results also suggest that 
differences between private and public market valuation parameters cause most of the 
observed differences between private real estate and publicly traded REIT performance.
Ghosh et al. (1996) argue that findings o f similarity between REITs and small-cap 
stocks are based on pre-1994 data and, in many cases, pre-1992 data. Because the market
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capitalization of the REIT has quadrupled since 1992, results drawn from the previous 
research may be erroneous. The authors examine the correlation of historic returns, bid- 
ask spread, institutional ownership, trading volume, and the efficacy o f trading rules 
based on large one-day price changes. Correlations show that REITs are less like other 
stocks, and provide more diversification. The results also indicate that REITs appear to 
be less liquid than other comparable-size stocks. Finally, they conclude that REITs are a 
bit more like direct real estate investment compared to other types o f stocks, from the 
perspective of diversification and liquidity.
Acton and Poutasse (1997) also examine the change in the correlation coefficient 
between private and public (REIT) markets, employing the NCREIF Property Index, 
NAREIT Equity REIT index, and a hedged REIT index. They find a positive correlation 
between the NCREIF Property Index and NAREIT Equity REIT indexes, and also 
between the NCREIF Property Index and a hedged REIT index, beginning around 1993. 
They conclude that the returns o f  the public and private real estate markets are being 
forced toward similarity because o f structural changes that have occurred in the REIT 
market since 1993, resulting in much greater institutional investment in REITs.
The present study differs from the extant literature in several respects. First, this is 
the first paper which attempts to measure the efficiencies o f equity REITs by applying 
more than one method to the same data set. Second, five different measures o f 
nonstochastic efficiency scores such as cost efficiency, allocative efficiency, technical 
efficiency, pure technical efficiency, and scale efficiency are estimated. Stochastic 
alternative profit efficiency is also estimated to explain REITs’ output efficiencies. This 
is the first study predicting and analyzing the profit efficiency, cost efficiency and 
allocative efficiencies o f  REITs. Finally, in addition to size, management type,
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diversification and leverage variables, this study investigates the impact of market power, 
risk, growth, and control and governance variables on REIT efficiencies.
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Data
Efficiency analysis data come from the SNL REIT Quarterly for the years 1989 
through 1999, with a total o f 1671 observations from 280 equity REITs. This represents a 
comprehensive set of equity REITs with the necessary input and output variables. Many 
observations (296) are dropped due to missing information2. The final data set is 
comprised o f  1375 observations from 235 equity REITs over the eleven-year study 
period.
REITs have become a major source of funding for the real estate industry by the 
rapid increase in security offerings. The distribution o f equity REITs and security 
offerings for all REITs across the years is shown in Table 1. O f particular interest is the 
large number o f  initial public offerings in 1993 and 1994, representing the formation o f 
new REITs. There were 191 REITs formed between 1989 and 1999, and 95 of these were 
formed in 1993 and 1994. The capital raised from initial public offerings was about S I6.5 
billion in these two years, which was about 53% o f the entire period. Total equity 
capitalization increased from SI 1 billion at the end o f 1992 to S26 billion in 1993. This 
rapid growth continued during 1994 with more than S38 billion. After 1994, the focus 
shifted to secondary offerings, with more than S7 billion raised in 1995, SI I billion in 
1996, S26 billion in 1997, and S19 billion during 1998. The number of offerings 
increased from 52 in 1994 to 297 in 1998. All o f this growth resulted in a market
2 For instance, input prices, for some REITs, could not be determined because correspondent input values 
were reported as zero.
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comprised of 167 equity REITs with a total market capitalization o f more than SI 18 
billion.
2.3.1.1 Empirical Design. There are several reasons that this study focuses on 
equity REIT efficiency. Equity, mortgage, and hybrid REIT forms are totally separate3. 
Their operating environment and goals reflect their proportion of equity or mortgage 
asset holdings. It is, therefore, inappropriate to combine all three types in the same 
frontier. Furthermore, efficiency measures from mortgage and hybrid REITs could be 
biased or missing because o f few observations for most years.
There is no consensus among researchers about what constitutes REIT 
productionor how to measure output4. Considering the output measures from other 
efficiency analyses and following the premise o f REIT efficiency studies (Bers and 
Springer, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, and Anderson et. al., 1999), total asset is deemed the most 
appropriate output measure. Additionally, Springer (1998) finds three results that validate 
the total assets as an output variable. First, total assets have a high correlation with 
market capitalization; second, it has lower variance and yields more consistent results; 
and third, any bias is conservative3.
The total assets as a REIT output can be decomposed into three categories: loans, 
properties, and other assets. These are the value o f all real estate loans (L); all properties 
owned by the company in operation (P); other assets (OA) consist o f non-operational
3 The National Association o f Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) classifies REITs as equity, 
mortgage, and hybrid REITs according to their respective holdings of real property or mortgage 
instruments. To be considered an equity (mortgage) REIT, at least 75% of the REIT investment portfolio 
must consist of income producing real property (mortgage instruments). Hybrid REITs combine the 
activities of equity and mortgage REITs.
4 Possible measures include assets, dividends or FFO, market capitalization and space measures (square 
footage, number of units, etc.).
5 Refer to Springer (1998) for a detailed discussion about the justification of possible REIT outputs.
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properties, unconsolidated partnership (which is the value o f  joint ventures), and all non- 
real estate investment assets6. The outputs are meaningful for the efficiency analysis 
because income (rent and/or interest) from these outputs depends on the management’s 
decisions regarding where to invest — buying real estate or giving loans.
Input variables are proxied by costs in REIT economies o f scale and efficiency 
studies mentioned in Section 2. Cost variables (interest expense and non-interest expense) 
have also been used as input variables in some bank efficiency studies such as Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990), Miller and Noulas (1996), and Avkiran (1999). Similarly, there are two 
input measures that naturally emerge from the SNL dataset. These are interest expense 
(IE) and property operating expense (POE)7. Interest expense is the cost of debt and 
other borrowings including the amortization of debt discounts. Property operating 
expense is associated with rental properties, including maintenance, utilities, property 
management fees, and real estate taxes. Input prices are proxied for the interest expense 
and property operating expense inputs, following the same approaches of Mester (1987) 
and Ferrier and Lovell (1990)8. The price o f interest expense (PIE) is the interest expense 
divided by all borrowings, notes, debentures, and repurchase agreements. The price of 
property operating expense (PPOE) is operating expense divided by rental income.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for outputs, inputs and input prices o f the 
REITs for the years 1989 through 1999. Loan production has a U-shaped pattern,
6 Non-operational properties include properties under development, land held for development, and 
property held for sale. Other assets also include unconsolidated partnership which is the value of joint 
ventures, and all non-real estate investment assets.
The SNL REIT Quarterly also releases “Other Expenses” as an expense item in the related income 
statements. However, “Other Expenses” was not used as an input variable because of the difficulties of 
determining the price of this variable.
8 In their banking and savings and loans studies, they constructed the price of capital as occupancy cost and 
expenditure on furniture and equipment divided by the level of deposit, and the price of expenditure on 
materials as expenditure on materials divided by the level of deposit as proxy input prices. Similarly, the 
present paper employs debt and rental income for the price of interest expense and property operating 
expense, respectively.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
;szz- .
V - »
fc'SJ*
p p
s . v
©N
O f
©N
O n
2
o v
© nON '
O v . 
ON
O N  '. 
O n .
O nOO
ON.
r» #n © r-» 
•n  O
© O' — r*» 
PM 0 _  
cn  rn 
<M ©
«n ^  
r -  o '  
—  m-v
tp\ «n
as oT
«/N —o  ©» ©
m  o
OO T
o  ©
t o  n*
oo o<o «o 
© .  
rn  00
00 —
o
00 ©
*n <o P*^  oo
o  p-
ro  00O s
w <o 
ON
cn oe 
r*- »o 
v i  os  8  2
P*» ©  
—  00 
©  ©  —  ©
oo «n 
o  —
• t  <1  'C 00 — *r 
m  ra
r*\ © 
CM t o
o  ©„ 
cT  m  
r*  ©
PM PM
«o m  
©  
e> fn  
©  —  
«N M
O' oo
OO 00 © ro
» 00 tPi
PM cm © r->pn ©
PM ©
*r\ —
c v  r** 
^  ==>. 
©  ©  m ©
«r. oo 2  S
O . * i  00 CM
f  -r £{ }Q r i c
—  PM 2  21 PM r~\
*T ^ 2 2 PM ©
• o  35 ®  «  «  <ncn S  °°. cm oo•5* E £—  S  2 :  ^ * 3 ,
*n i
m  Cn 
NO o
© n  •a oo
OO CN 
CN. 
r*  ^ n*
00 ©  
«n pm© «/N 
©* CM 
- •  CM
CM tO 
OO c -
- . O .  © ©
o
“ CN*
VN r-i
o q  kv
O  O  © nC
©  00 «o © © — 
©  —  
^  r -
O  CM
©  r -
—  —  CM
©  m  »n ©©  oo — —
©  CM
n *  n*“
 ©
© r-> 
rn  pm© r*\ 
© ' O0*
r- ©
~  CM
p * p»T
no 00
NO —
o  o  
o  ©
o  o  
©  ©
>6 nO © O © © *
©  ©  
©  ©
©  ©  
©  ©
©  
©  cn 
©  ©  
©  ©
cn ©
OO «SN 
©  ©
©  ©  
©  © ’
OO ©  oe —* 
©  ©
00 ©  
©  v .  
©  ©  
©  ©
©  
cm  < n  m  —
2S
e .
iff! *
i  i
i f*>; twt- r .^ r*-;;
>g -
i * S ~ *•**© £  .*•"•“•
= r . % = .  e . r . w ; j
'W -S -  S a j i ' S  - i - W
■ l ^ w m
2 -  S  2  2L.^s.><<; i.®-J t  P-'u— •" j - .-c :  V - f e T j . -
LS£-;—- ^  '® *0 » ,;’7/
O ' ' C - ©  *•'
■&-5 - S  S  <».:
I l i f ta  o_  SL-SJL*;:-2- ° «• £'-«:
— ■-., 
2 . fc/fe'S
^■|5 2 ' *^*
©  a . o  »  a  ; .«-—«««* fl*.-.. •'V■ -jz «*. „ -•/*.S ^ . t S  ■■- •• S 8* 5  • - »; -8 i— w & ®- o  e  ^_ _ ® -5- *»•.'-■ •v o er
= - s f s ^ - v ,:
2  -S a  2-’"".’ » s r o  e  ;
5  j5 
«* £ ■ ' • ■ ■ ■ ■  —^ U©••^ 99*3 » ; ^ ■ o ,£  S  H •
1=' S 3  3  '§■:-
a  & «  a  .'
H  »  S8 .S  
O  » , «  i .  ■:C  S  ^  Q
> V  >  H  t
S i l  | l - '
F£S
- I f s
^■.8'ts  g; I  jl:
ro - 5 - — o  '
(S 2  "« &.•?— u "P - >
a u ® s  »S t-P  S  ■O.-
"S ■«« ;« 5? <"; £  V  o  1 0  u .5  U T3 > .£
J .2  S..f “ |
_r ^ §  .5  — 3  c  "  §  „  «  B .
g l S v  St.H
I.-3  .S i  S5 o 
§^.£ f i t s-o-pk c 5e iff w ; >  U f  oo, 5 .  3  er
- o : ^ . 5  =  5 . 2  w o- *2 V C a
T3 c *3 S e >
§ SL.S.2 ! *^  »» S  «• “ « • ?— .H " .o a -o S 
k  c  -g s fg .
S .g  S .J  - I<-> *  « <— 8  S i 
£ ~O g f  2
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4
27
declining from $18 million in 1989 to the lowest level o f $3 million in 1993, and then 
increasing to $25 million in 1999. However, properties steadily increase over the period, 
and dominate loans by at least a factor o f 7 in 1989 and at most a factor o f 78 in 1993. 
This is mainly because o f the interest rate pattern, declining from 7.91% in 1989 to the 
lowest level o f 3.33% in 1993. In this period, REITs preferred purchasing property by 
using less expensive funds to making loans with low interest rates. Therefore, as is shown 
in Table 2, REIT interest expenses increased about 100% between 1991 and 1993.
2.3.2 Methodology
This study employs both nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
the parametric Stochastic (Economic) Frontier Approach (SFA) to measure equity 
REITs’ input efficiencies; cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies, 
and profit efficiency over the period 1989-1999.
2.3.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (PEA). The DEA is a linear programming 
technique that maps a piecewise linear convex isoquant (a non-parametric surface 
frontier) over data points to determine the efficiencies o f each Decision Making Unit 
(DMU) relative to this isoquant. In this application, a DMU is one REIT. The objective 
o f the DEA is to measure relative efficiency among similar organizations (DMUs) that 
share the same technology (processing procedure) to gain achievements (outputs) through 
using similar resources (inputs). Cost efficiency (CE) can be decomposed into allocative 
efficiency (AE) and technical efficiency (TE). The DEA also allows the decomposition of 
technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE).The 
efficiency scores o f DMUs are bounded between 0 and I , with the most efficient firms 
having an efficiency score o f 1.
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Several alternative models have been introduced in the DEA literature [see 
Chames et al., (1994) for details]. Each of these models seeks to determine which DMUs 
establishes the best efficiency frontier. The DEA model defines the shape o f the 
efficiency frontier. This study uses the CCR (Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978) as 
well as the BCC (Banker, Chames, and Cooper, 1984) input oriented models, where the 
first model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), but the second assumes variable- 
retums to scale (VRS). Note that the production frontier changes from a cone shape in the 
former model to a convex- hull shape in the latter.
2.3.2.1.1 The CRS TE (TE). First, following Chames et. al. (1978), 
consider AT REITs, operating under the CRS and employing two inputs to produce a single 
output. The following linear programming problem for the technical efficiency (TE) is 
solved:
MiriTE.w TEi 
s.t.
Y . w, > y,- 
X . Wj <TEi. x,
w, > 0 (1)
where TEi, is a scalar and represents the technical efficiency measure (index) for the /-th 
REIT, w, is the lx N  vector o f intensity weights defining the linear combination of 
efficient REITs to be compared with the /-th REIT. The inequality (T . w, > yi) implies 
that the observed outputs must be less than or equal to a linear combination o f outputs of 
the REITs forming the efficient frontier. The inequality ( X . w, < T E . x,) assures that the 
use o f inputs at the linear combination of the efficient REITs must be less or equal to the
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use of inputs o f the /'-th REIT. The formulation requires that TE,- ^  I ■ An index value o f 1 
refers to a point on the frontier, and thus to a technically efficient REIT (Farrel, 1957).
2.3.2.1.2 The VRS T E  (PTE). The CRS specification biases the TE 
estimation by confounding scale effects if  all REITs do not operate at an optimal scale. In 
this case, following Banker et. al. (1984), the pure technical efficiency (PTE), i.e., TE 
devoid of the scale effects, can be estimated by the substitution o f the CRS with VRS 
assumption. This can be achieved by adding a convexity constraint ( N / . w/ = I) to (1):
MirtfE.w TEi 
s.t.
Y .W i > y,- 
X.Wi < TEi - Xi 
N [. Wi = 1
Wi >  0  (2)
where N/ is an I xN  vector of ones. The VRS frontier envelops the data more tightly than 
the CRS frontier, and thus generates TE scores which are greater than or equal to those 
obtained from the CRS frontier.
2.3.2.1.3 The SE. Scale inefficiency occurs if there is a difference 
between the CRS TE and the VRS TE (PTE) for a specific REIT. Since, TE = PTE*SE, 
then, SE = TE / PTE.
2.3.2.1.4 The Non-IRS TE. An additional linear program is run to 
determine whether the REIT is operating at increasing returns to scale (IRS) or 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). This new constructed frontier allows for only non-
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increasing returns to scale (Non-IRS). This can be accomplished by substituting the 
constraint ( N / . w, — J) in (2) with (N i . w,- < 1) as demonstrated below:
MinTEw TE, 
s.t.
Y .  wi > y i  
X . wi < T E i . x,
N i . Wi < 1
Wi > 0 (3)
The type o f scale inefficiencies (IRS or DRS) for a specific REIT can be determined as 
follows:
If VRS TE *  Non-IRS TE, then the REIT is operating at IRS,
If VRS TE =  Non-IRS TE, then the REIT is operating at DRS.
2.3.2.1.5 The Allocative (AE) and  Cost Efficiencies (CE). This study 
also measures both allocative (AE) and overall cost efficiencies (CE) given the input 
prices p, and the output levels y, for the i-th REIT. The product o f TE and AE is the 
overall cost efficiency. Therefore, the cost minimizing vector o f input quantities, x \  
should be computed by running the VRS case linear program. Then, the following cost 
minimization DEA is run:
Afifi^ p i . Xi 
s.t.
Y . Wi  > y,
X . wi <Xj*
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N i . w, = /
w, > 0 (4)
The overall cost efficiency (CE) o f the i-th REIT could be obtained as follows: 
Pfx] minimum costCiS = —; = 1 1 - ----
p ixi observed cost 
Since CE = AE x TE, then AE can be calculated residually: AE = CE / TE.
2.3.2.2 Stochastic (Economic) Frontier Approach (SFA). Studies concentrating 
on the banking industry have shown that firms not only err by failing to minimize cost 
but also err by failing to maximize profitability [see Berger et al., 1993, DeYoung and 
Nolle, 1996; Akhavein et al., 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997 for details]. Berger et al., 
(1993) showed that profit inefficiency is more significant than cost inefficiency in 
determining overall firm efficiency, and that banks lose about 50% o f their potential 
profits from failure to operate on their efficient profit frontier. Anderson et al. (2000) 
found similar results in their residential real estate brokerage efficiency study.
The profit function accounts for the revenue effects o f producing at incorrect 
mixes or levels of outputs, and REITs might err on the output side. A REIT might be 
input (cost) inefficient, but at the same time output (revenue) efficient or vice versa. For 
example, higher quality real property (output) needs more expenses (input). In this case, 
cost efficiency models label REITs as cost inefficient without incorporating the quality of 
output. However, REITs with higher quality properties have additional revenues, which 
offset some of their high expenses because customers often pay more for higher quality. 
Additionally, REIT managers might be more interested in profit efficiency because 
income is their major source used for debt payments and growth. Furthermore, managers 
are under pressure o f shareholders for higher profits because o f the dividend requirement.
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This study employs the stochastic (economic) frontier approach to measure 
nonstandard (alternative) profit efficiency, which accounts for output side errors. The 
Stochastic frontier models were first introduced by Aigner et. al. (1977) and Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977). Alternative profit function is similar to cost function used in 
their model. Independent variables are the same, but profit instead o f cost is used as a 
dependent variable. I estimate the following translog profit function:
In* (P,Y), = a 0 + i >  InK, t a r t a r ,  + 2 > ,  ln/>
^  I m i  k
where In is natural logarithm; Jt is net income of the REIT r ; Y  is a vector of outputs; P is 
a vector o f input prices. The composite error term for rth REIT (sr = In ur + In vr) can be 
decomposed into an identifiable random error, vr, which is assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed as N { 0 , a l ) , while the other error component, ur, is derived
from a iV(0,cr;) distribution truncated below zero, which represents controllable 
inefficiencies. The underlying reason for such a truncated normal distribution assumption 
is that inefficiencies cannot be negative.
The relative efficiency o f  a firm can be estimated by means of the ratio, 
k  — c7u l a v (Jondrow et al., 1982). The ur, inefficiency measure, o f a REIT can be 
formulated as follows:
ur = [a l  /(I + 11 )][-<(>{£r A / a )  /  0 ( s rl /  a)  + {erH  a )] (4)
where a  — [au+crv]2; <(> is the standard normal density function; O is the cumulative 
normal density function.
Following the studies o f  Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Berger and Mester (1997)
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and DeYoung and Hasan (1998), nonstandard (alternative) profit efficiency is defined as 
how close a firm is to generating maximum profits given its output levels. For example, a 
REIT having 85% profit efficiency suggests that the REIT would earn about 15% more 
profits than what it was making if  it were operating on the efficient frontier9. Because o f 
the data-fitting problem, particularly in 1989 and 1999, a frontier is constructed for the 
period (1989-1999) instead of each year to estimate the profit efficiency scores10.
2.4 Empirical Results Relating to Efficiency Estimates
The equity REITs efficiency estimates are presented in Table 3. Figures 1 and 2
show that overall efficiency measures generally follow a U-shaped pattern, with a decline
in the early years o f  the sample, 1989-1993, and rising from 1995-1998. Their pattern
might be attributed to increasing interest expense (IE) and a decreasing loan (L) amount.
An upward trend appears in the interest expense, which rises by 69% from 1989 until
1992 and falls 31% in 1994. The U-shaped pattern of loans is consistent over the same
time period, falling by 81% and rising after 1993 (Table 2, Figures 3 and 4).
REITs typically raise debt to finance new property acquisition, and are able to
borrow using unsecured corporate lines o f credit, which is cheaper and more flexible in
terms o f prepayment and availability than mortgage loans11 (Murray, 2000). Lenders
generally expect to be repaid from the proceeds o f  equity and focus on a REIT’s access to
the capital markets, and raise equity capital. Interestingly, over the sample period, the
U.S. economy has experienced a similar U-shaped interest rates pattern. It declined from
9 Output prices are used in calculating standard profit efficiency. A detailed description of standard profit 
efficiency could be found in Berger et. al. (1993), DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Akhavein et al., (1997), and 
Berger and Mester (1997).
>0The same problem occurred in estimating the stochastic cost efficiency scores for many years, and for a 
new frontier including the sample period.
11 REITs cannot obtain mortgage loans at greater than a 40% of loan-to-value, but corporate debt at rates as 
low as 10-20 basis points over LIBOR (Murray, 2000).
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7.91% in 1989 to the lowest level o f 3.33% in 1993, then started rose to 5.36% in 1997, 
and declined to 4.85% in 1998 and 4.78% in 1999. Therefore, REITs had access to less 
expensive funds for financing property acquisition instead o f making loans in the era of 
lower interest rates.
Competition among the increasing number o f REITs might be the reason for the 
rise in overall efficiency measures after 1993. Since REITs must pay at least 95% of their 
taxable income as dividends, debt must be used to finance acquisitions12. Liquidity and 
stock performance is a critical aspect o f  REIT lending because, as mentioned above, debt 
is paid by equity proceeds. Positive stock performance is preferred by the highest 
leveraged firms in order to gain more capital and decrease debt. Stock prices will likely 
reflect the cost saving results o f more efficient firms. The growth in all REIT market 
capitalization is shown in Table 4. From 1989 through 2000, the number o f  equity REITs 
rose from 56 to 158. O f particular interest is the large number o f initial public offerings in 
1993 and 1994. There is a 52% and 30% increase in equity REITs in these years. The 
total market capitalization increased from S6.8 billion to S134 billion13. The average 
annual number o f equity REITs for the first period is 72.3; for the latter period, the 
average is 166. Accordingly, there is a substantial increase in market capitalization for 
the period 1993-2000, averaging more than S87 billion per year, which is more than 11 
times that o f the preceding four years.
There are several explanations for the growth of REITs in recent years. In early 
1990, REIT shares were attractive partially because of declining interest rates, compared 
to certificates o f deposits (CDs). Instead o f  replacing maturing higher yield CDs with
12 It is reduced to 90% with the REIT Modernization Act o f 1999, effective in 2001.
,2A s  noted by the dollar amount, 1993 to the present is significantly different from 1989-92.
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lower yield CDs, investors bought REIT shares without regard for the possible risk 
differences between CDs and REIT shares (Etter, 1998). The increasing popularity o f 
REITs caused the creation o f new REITs and the expansion o f existing ones. In 
particular, Umbrella Partnership REIT (UP RE IT), which first appeared in 1992, spurred 
the REIT market growth. The UP REIT structure allows real estate partnerships to 
become a REIT without imposing a tax liability for the individual partners. After creating 
an UPREIT, the partners have an option to receive units representing their ownership 
interests in the new trust. The properties’ original owners can avoid the taxes by retaining 
their partnership interests rather than converting them to shares in the UPREIT [see 
Kleiman, 1993 for more detail]. The UPREIT structure accounts for two- thirds o f new 
outstanding REITs (Ambrose and Linneman, 1998).
The third factor explaining the growth in REITs is the Revenue Reconciliation 
Act o f 1993. Prior to the Act, a REIT’s income was taxable if five or fewer individuals 
owned more than 50%. It was difficult for pension funds to make large investments in a 
single REIT. After 1993, REIT shares have been considered to be owned by the 
beneficiaries rather than the institution, allowing pension funds to become REIT owners. 
Hence, increasing institutional investment helped REITs grow in both primary and 
secondary markets.
2.4.1 General Efficiency Measures
Table 3 indicates that average allocative efficiency is about 65%, whereas average 
technical efficiency is about 24%. This means that input (costs) utilization could be 
reduced if the REITs were on the efficient frontier. Over the sample period, technical 
efficiency is generally smaller than allocative efficiency, suggesting that the dominant 
source of cost inefficiency is managerial. REITs are more successful in choosing the
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correct mix o f inputs than in properly utilizing the inputs.
Technical efficiency is confounded with scale efficiencies under the assumption 
of constant returns to scale. The variable returns to scale assumption, on the other hand, 
provides the measurement o f “pure” technical efficiency, which is technical efficiency 
without the scale efficiency effects. Average scale efficiency and pure technical 
efficiency are about 65% and 41%, respectively. Pure technical inefficiency is generally 
larger than the scale inefficiency (Figure 1, Table 3) suggesting that the dominant source 
of overall technical inefficiency is the pure technical (input related) inefficiency14.
2.4.2 Returns to Scale Among Real Estate Investment Trust
The scale related nature of the overall technical inefficiency makes the trend in 
REIT returns to scale interesting. The procedure suggested by Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell 
(1985) here identifies the sources o f scale inefficiency deviation from an optimal 
standard. Returns to scale is the effect on output that results from increasing all inputs by 
the same percentage. There are three possible cases: (1) Constant returns to scale (CRS), 
which arise when the percentage change in input yields the same percentage output 
change; (2) Decreasing returns to scale (DRS), which occur when percentage change in 
outputs is less than in inputs; (3) Increasing returns to scale (IRS), which exist when 
percentage change in output is greater than that o f  inputs.
The number and percentage of REITs operating at different levels o f  scale
economies is reported in Table 5. As is evident from Figure 5, although scale efficient
(i.e., CRS) REITs have declined from 26% to 2% over the 11 years, implying less scale
14 The allocative efficiency measures the proportional reduction in costs if the REIT chooses the right mix 
of inputs given the prices, reflecting the firm’s regulatory politics. The technical efficiency measures the 
proportional reduction in input usage which can be reached if the REIT operates on the frontier, reflecting 
the firm’s managerial decision. The pure technical efficiency measures the proportional reduction in input 
usage if inputs are not wasted, whereas scale efficiency is the proportional reduction if the REIT achieves 
constant returns to scale.
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efficiency over time, most firms have experienced diseconomies o f scale (i.e., DRS), for 
instance, 43% in 1989, 83% in 1993, and 80% in 1999. The share o f  the REITs 
experiencing economies o f  scale (i.e., IRS) has a different trend over this time. It fell 
from 62% in 1990 to 9% in 1993 and rose to 60% in 1997, and then fell to 18% in 1999. 
More intuitive explanations for scale inefficiencies might be obtained by dividing the 
REITs into different size groups15. As Table 5 shows, on the average, 92% o f all REITs 
are scale inefficient (i.e., DRS or IRS) while a small number, 8%, are scale efficient. Of 
the scale inefficient firms, the share o f the REITs experiencing diseconomies o f  scale and 
economies o f scale is 59% and 41%, respectively. Interestingly, only 6% o f the REITs 
experiencing DRS are small, but the majority (94%) are medium or large. In contrast, 
only 1% of the REITs experiencing IRS are small. Examining the firms experiencing 
different modes o f scale efficiencies in different sizes shown in Figure 6 further reveals 
that 92% of all large REITs are experiencing DRS. Of the small REITs, the majority, 
79%, are experiencing IRS. The results are clearly consistent with the fact that REITs 
have been experiencing diseconomies of scale with the dramatic and ongoing merger and 
acquisition activities since 1995.
2.4.3 Second Staee Regression Analysis
After recovering the efficiency scores from the DEA and SFA analyses, size 
variables, governance variable, market power and niche variables, risk variables, and 
other REIT traits were used to explain variations in efficiency across REITs. Table 6 
displays definitions, means and standard deviations o f the above independent variables 
and dependent variables, namely cost efficiency (CE), allocative efficiency (AE),
15 Small size REITs have assets less than 100 million; medium size REITs with assets between 100 million 
and 1 billion; and large REIT with assets larger than 1 billion.
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Table 6. Definition and Summary Statistics of the Efficiency Correlates
Variables Definition o f  the variables Mean Std dev
D ependent variables:
C E Cost efficiency, product o f  technical (TE) and allocative (AE) efficiency, 
which measures overall input efficiency o f a REIT.
0 .1 4 1 0.171
A E Allocative efficiency, CETTE, choosing the right input combinations given 
input prices (regulation-related).
0.652 0.265
T E Technical efficiency, CE/AE or PTE'SE, using equal or less o f  all inputs 
to produce a  given output, as compared to the alternative (under 
management control, usually driven by strong competition).
0.243 0 .254
PTE Pure technical efficiency. TE/SE. technical efficiency under the variable 
returns to scale (VRS), i.e., TE which is devoid o f  scale efficiency effects.
0.413 0 .320
SE Scale efficiency, TE/PTE, whether a REIT has the right size, i.e., whether 
it produces where the long run average curve (LRAC) is minimum, where 
constant returns to scale (CRS) is observed.
0.646 0.312
PE Alternative (nonstandard) profit efficiency, defined as how close a REIT 
comes to earning maximum profits given its output levels.
0.269 0.097
Independent variab les
Size variables
SM L_REIT Dummy, equals one if  REITs have total assets (TA) below S I00 million. 0.011 0 .020
Excluded from the regressions as the base case.
M ED  REIT Dummy, equals one if  REITs have TA of SI0O million to SI billion. 0.592 0 .492
L A R JtE IT Dummy, equals one if  REITs have TA overSI billion. 0.165 0.375
Governance variable
C EO _CHA Dummy, equals one if  the chief executive officer (CEO) o f  the REIT is 0.313 0 .464
also the chairman o f  the board.
Market power and
niche variables
PROPERY SH A R E REIT’s share o f  property in the market. 0.011 0.020
PRO_IND Property diversity, as measured by the index Z  P ^  , where n equals the 0-783 0.245
r '= I
number o f  property-cype invested, and P, equals the proportion o f  a REIT's 
portfolio invested in property-type
G EO _IN D  Geographic diversity, as measured by the index Z  G ?  , where n equals 0-556 0.288
i=l
the number o f  region invested, and G, equals the proportion o f  a REIT’s 
portfolio invested in region i.
LOAN_TA Loans divided by total assets (TA) 0.029 0.093
T L_TA  Debt ratio, total liability (TL) divided by total assets (TA) 0.585 0 .417
Risk variables
STD_RO A  Standard deviation over time o f  the REIT's annual return on asset. 0.030 0 .047
EQ_TA Equity divided by TA. 0.406 0.616
Other REIT traits
SE LF Dummy, equals one if  REIT is internally managed ones that they use their 0.678 0 .467
M A N A G E M E N T  own employees to manage the assets and investments.
G ROW TH The annual growth rate o f  the total assets. 0.585 2.456
technical efficiency (TE), pure technical efficiency (PTE), scale efficiency (SE) and 
nonstandard (alternative) profit efficiency (PE). The Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
multiple regressions are employed rather than standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions because the dependent variables in the second stage regressions, various 
efficiency measures, are estimates. Table 7 reports the regression results.
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Table 7. Correlates of the Nonparametric (CE, AE, TE, PTE, & SE) and 
Parametric (PE) Efficiency Scores1
IndepJDep. Vars CE AE TE PTE SE PE
INTERCEPT 0.093 0.595 0.199 0.323 0.671’ 0.262" ’
(3.091) (7.473) (3.500) (3.586) (8.193) (8.056)
Size variables: 
MEDIUM 0.011 -0.007 0.012 -0.058 0.102"* 0.041’’*
(0.536) (-0.183) (0.706) (-1.600) (2.742) (2.694)
LARGE 0.034 -0.011" 0.069" 0 .124 '" -0.018 0.106’"
(1.459) (-2.329) (1.964) (2.887) (-0.343) (5.858)
Market power and 
niche variables: 
PROPERTY SHARE -2.000'" 1.514 -3.997"' 12.292"' -17.006'" -3.471"'
(-2.816) (0.862) (-3.533) (7.555) (-5.193) (-4.456)
LOAN/TA 0.804"* 0.141 0 .908" ' 0 .866 '" 0.412"* 0.085"
(3.577) (0.613) (4-751) (4.596) (4.433) (2.305)
TLTA -0.071"' 0.035 -0.128’" -0 .193"' 0.034 -0.019
(-4.244) (0.573) (-3.441) (-2.462) (0.467) (-0.773)
PROPJNDEX 0.681x10-* 0.027 -0.016 -0.008 -0.040 0.009
(0.002) (0.520) (-0.383) (-0.169) (-0.876) (0.621)
GEOJNDEX 0.007 0.029 -0.020 -0.016 -0.024 0.002
(0.371) (0.702) (-0.697) (-0.426) (-0.607) (0.134)
Governance variable:
CEO_CHAIRMAN -0.021" -0 .061 '" -0.021 0.026 -0.095’*' 0.014"
(-1.970) (-2.546) (-1.276) (1312) (-4.020) (1.978)
Risk variables: 
Std (ROA) -0.190 -0.016 -0.437 -0.559 -0.207 0.173
(-0.665) (-0.046) (-1.039) (-1.401) (-0.610) (1.572)
EQUITY/TA 0.119'" 0.049 0 .195 '" 0 .236 '" 0.050 0.009
(4.800) (0.724) (4.395) (2.885) (0.656) (0.361)
Other REIT
variables:
GROWTH 0.017" -0.007 0.027"’ 0.022" 0.028" -0.010"’
(2.244) (-0.645) (2.654) (2.089) (2.134) (-2.878)
SELF -0.011 0.010 -0.003 -0.038 0.018 -0.024"
MANAGEMENT (-0.691) (0.343) (-0.120) (-1-423) (0.637) (-2.254)
Model:
Adjusted ft-squared 0.260 0.013 0.222 0.405 0.275 0.095
F-statistics 17.491'" 1.628' 14.405"' 32.936"' 18.862'" 5.911"*
DtF-statistics 1.889 1.294 1.821 1.764 1.618 0.748
* CE: Cost Eft'.; AE: Allocative EtT.; TE: Technical Eff.; PTE: Pure Technical EtT.; SE: Scale Eflf.. PE: Stochastic Alternative Profit 
EtT. The columns report multivariate Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression coefficients (with /'Statistics in parentheses), 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% confidence levels, respectively.
2.4.3.1 Size Variables. In the X-efficiency literature, it is typically argued that 
firm size should be strongly associated with efficiency. The results show that both 
medium and large REITs have an insignificant positive relationship with cost efficiency. 
Insignificance implies that REITs are equally competitive or equally able to control costs 
regardless o f their size. Technical and pure technical efficiency, i.e., technical efficiency
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devoid of scale effects, are positively related to large REITs. It seems that large REITs 
operate more efficiently perhaps because o f the ability to produce on a large scale, which 
exploits the fixed inputs such as administrative and overhead expenses.
The results also indicate that scale efficiency decreases with REIT size. This 
provides evidence for our earlier findings that the sharing of experiencing decreasing 
returns to scale for larger REITs (92%) is much more than that for medium (61%) and 
small (13%) REITs. Highly positive scale efficiency in both small and medium REITs, 
although all sizes o f REITs are experiencing scale inefficiency, implies that decreasing 
returns to scale has much impact on scale efficiency. However, growth in scale does not 
harm the small and medium size REITs.
Both large and medium REITs are found to be profit efficient at the 0.01 level. 
This suggests that larger REITs are more output-oriented and more careful in their 
production plan. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) argue that larger firms might be more 
cost conscious due to greater pressure from shareholders concerning bottom line profits. 
Since REITs must pay dividends of at least 95% o f their taxable income, the management 
team has more pressure from owners.
2.4.3.2 Property Share. Because a great proportion of equity REITs’ income 
comes from properties, this study captures some aspects o f  market power with the ratio of 
REIT properties to the total properties for each year. REITs with more market power 
have significantly lower cost, technical and scale efficiencies. The result suggests that, as 
reported earlier, large REITs with more market power suffer from diseconomies o f scale, 
leading to significantly lower scale and technical efficiency. A significant positive 
relationship, in contrast to other efficiencies, with pure technical efficiency favors this 
explanation because pure technical efficiency measure is not affected by scale
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inefficiency. Profit efficiency is negatively related to market power, which is contrary to 
both efficient structure and market power hypothesis.
2.4.33 Loan Production (LOAN/TA). Since equity REITs might provide loans 
of up to 25% o f their portfolio, it is worthwhile to see whether there is an association 
between efficiency and loan production. The results show that loan production is 
significantly positively related to all efficiency measures except for allocative efficiency. 
These results overall imply that REITs with higher LOAN/TA tend to have higher cost, 
technical and scale efficiencies. Profit efficiency is also positively associated with loan 
production, implying that loans are more highly valued than properties. These results 
suggest higher operating efficiencies for hybrid REITs, promising further study.
2.4.3.4 Debt Ratio (TL/TA). In their economies o f scale estimation, Bers and 
Springer (1998a) report that the average scale economy of low-Ieverage REITs is much 
higher than that of high-leverage REITs. This result implies that low-leverage REITs 
acquire more benefits from increasing size than do high-leverage ones. In this study, debt 
ratio, as measured by total liability divided by total asset, is found to be negatively related 
to cost, technical and pure technical efficiencies. REITs using more debt have more 
financial risk, and their cost o f debt might be more than low-leverage REITs.
2.4.3.5 Concentration (Prop-Index and Geo-Index). REITs can be classified 
based on the type of property in which they concentrate their investment. These are 
residential, retail, industrial, office, health care, self-storage, hotel, restaurant, recreation, 
land, and diversified-other REITs. Properties of REITs can be located in one or different 
regions through the U.S. They are also divided by regions which are based on the 
National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciares (NCREIF). The regions are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
Northeast, Mideast, Southeast, East North Central, West North Central, Southwest, 
Mountain, Pacific, and Foreign.
To account for property-type diversification and geographic region investment 
differences across REITs, related Hirschman-Herfindahl indices were used to examine 
the impact o f property and geographic diversification on REIT efficiency. Property and 
geographic indexes are calculated as follows:
Pi = the proportion o f a REIT’s portfolio invested in property-type i, and
Rj = the proportion o f a REIT’s portfolio invested in region j .
Propindex and Geoindex measure the concentration o f investment into various 
property types and geographic areas. Higher value indices represent the lower level o f 
diversification for either property type or geographic area. Results for both indexes are 
insignificant. Positive relationships between both indexes and cost and profit efficiencies 
favors the hypothesis that more diversified REITs are less cost and profit efficient. 
However, it seems that property and geographic diversification do not cause inefficient 
input utilization, implying that REITs have highly skilled and knowledgeable 
management teams.
2.4.3.6 C orporate Governance and C ontrol (CEQ-CHAIRMAN). The theory 
o f the firm assumes that managers try to maximize shareholders’ wealth by operating the 
firm in the most efficient possible manner. However, the agency cost model of the firm
Propindex = ^  P * ,
j
where
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put forth by Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies that the objectives o f  stockholders and 
managers may deviate from each other, resulting in inefficient firm behavior. Managers 
are likely to maximize their wealth by increasing their perquisites or making non-optimal 
decisions unless there are external corporate control mechanisms such as compensation 
packages. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that separation of decision management from 
decision control is another way to alleviate such possible agency problems.
CEOs have the most power in the decision management process in terms of 
preparation and implementation of the projects. The board of directors is generally 
responsible for the most decision control, such as approving investments and monitoring 
the implementation. When the CEO is also the Chairman o f the Board, decision 
management and control o f the firm would be one-handed, and the principal-agent 
problem might get worse (Pi and Timme, 1993). Examining the efficiency differences 
between CEO-Chairman and NonCEO-Chairman affiliations in REITs, it is found that 
CEO-Chairman affiliated firms are negatively related to the cost, allocative and scale 
efficiencies supporting the agency cost theory16.
2.4.3.7 Overall Risk fStd(ROA)|. Riskier REITs may be more profit efficient if 
they are trading off between risk and return. Furthermore, efficient firms might be good 
at risk management, suggesting a negative relationship between cost efficiency and risk. 
Employing the standard deviation of return on assets as a direct measure o f risk, there is 
consistent but not significant coefficient signs o f  cost and profit efficiency. The results 
suggest that REITs with more variable returns are not different from other REITs.
16 In their efficiency studies in banking industry, Pi and Timme (1993) and Isik and Hassan (2001) also 
found an inverse relationship between efficiency measures and CEO-Chairman affiliated firms.
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2.4.3.8 Capital Risk (EQUITY/TA). Capital risk (equity to total assets) is the 
probability of becoming insolvent. A REIT with more equity is able to take more and 
cheaper debt with less chance o f  becoming insolvent. Accordingly, results indicate that 
well capitalized REITs have more cost, technical and pure technical efficiencies. 
Allocative, scale and profit efficiencies are also positively but not significantly associated 
with higher capitalization. This finding is consistent with the moral hazard theory, from 
the fact that managers with less capital to lose might take on riskier projects, and not pay 
attention to the efficiency as necessary. Another possible reason might be that efficient 
REITs have higher profits, which turns into a higher equity-asset ratio.
2.4.3.9 Growth. There is a significant positive relationship between growth rate 
(change in total assets) and all input efficiency measures except the allocative efficiency. 
The results suggest that REITs employ management teams with enough expertise and 
skill to overcome all operational details, and react to changing market conditions by 
making optimal decisions. An insignificant but negative relationship with allocative 
efficiency implies that property operating and interest expenses increase by growing 
quickly, but probably not in the correct mix. However, profit efficiency reduces with the 
growth rate, which is consistent with the results reported above. The loan production is 
positively associated with efficiency measures, including profit efficiency. The 
significant negative relationship found here might be further evidence that equity REITs 
mostly focus on properties in growing instead o f producing loans.
2.4.3.10 Type of M anagement. There are several forms of REIT management. 
Self-managed REITs that are internally managed use their own employees to manage the 
assets and investments. They can also be externally managed where either a third party or
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a REIT affiliate management firm supplies the services mentioned. By realizing the profit 
potential in the self-management o f  the operation, recent trends in the industry indicate 
that REITs are moving towards internal management, suggesting an increase in 
operational efficiency (Bers and Springer, 1997). The results do not support this notion to 
the extent that externally managed REITs are operated with more profit efficiency. 
Probably, third parties or REIT affiliate management firms still have more experience 
and skill in real estate operations than a REIT itself.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the evidence concerning the efficiency o f equity REITs 
from 1989 to 1999. The Data Envelopment Analysis was employed to measure the cost, 
allocative, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies. Alternative (nonstandard) 
profit efficiency was also measured using the Stochastic (Economic) Frontier Approach. 
The average efficiency for all indexes is very small. Over the years under study, overall 
cost and profit efficiencies for the REITs are 14% and 27%, respectively, implying that 
most of the REIT resources and potential profits are wasted during the REIT operations. 
The results also suggest that cost inefficiency is mostly caused by technical inefficiency 
rather than allocative inefficiency, implying that overall inefficiency can be attributed to 
underutilization or wasting o f inputs rather than choosing the incorrect input mix. It 
seems that managers of REITs are relatively better at choosing the appropriate input mix 
than utilizing the inputs.
Low technical efficiency does not necessarily imply only “poor management” in 
terms o f utilizing inputs. Further analysis suggests that there is technical inefficiency 
because o f operating off the efficient frontier and due to operating at incorrect scale.
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Consistent with the growth in the REIT industry, REITs have increasingly experienced 
diseconomies o f  scale in which the majority (94%) are large. This implies the importance 
of optimum size for the REIT industry because it incurs more operational costs because 
of scale inefficiency, which seems to be related more to being a greater, not lower, size 
than optimal. The result o f a negative (positive) relationship between large (small and 
medium) REITs and scale efficiency is another evidence o f going beyond the optimal 
size limit.
Several conclusions emerge from the second stage regression analysis. First, 
growing impacts the efficiency o f REITs positively because o f the fixed administrative 
and overhead expenses and because o f employing experienced management teams 
concentrating on properties in the real estate industry. Second, good capitalization and 
higher loan production makes the REITs more efficient. Third, REIT efficiency decreases 
with higher debt because the cost o f low leverage REITs’ debt is less than that of high 
leverage REITs. In addition, large REITs with more market power experience 
significantly lower scale, technical, and cost efficiencies. Finally, the results indicate that 
those REITs having separate management (decision) and board (control) structures are 
more efficient than those REITs with the same management and board.
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CHAPTER 3
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND REGULATORY 
CHANGES IN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
(REITs): AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
3.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, technological progress, legislation, and consolidations 
have been important developments in the financial services industry. Dramatic changes 
have attracted the attention o f  regulators, managers, investors, and researchers, who are 
interested in the impact o f these developments on operational efficiency. An extensive 
body of research has examined the performance o f  banks, thrifts, savings and loans, and 
insurance companies in the evolving environment and investigated the impact o f changes 
on cost efficiency, technological change, and productivity growth o f the financial services 
industry [e.g., see Berg et al., 1992; Elyasiyani and Mehdian, 1992; Mester, 1993; Fare et 
al., 1994; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999; Cummins et al., 
1999; and Isik and Hassan, 2001].
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) have experienced increasing structural and 
legal changes during the last two decades. In 1960, they were subject to a 90% ordinary 
income distribution test, i.e., they had to distribute most of their taxable income to 
shareholders. This requirement was increased to 95% on January I, 1980. Until 1986, 
REITs were required to hire managers to operate their properties. This situation
57
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affected the efficiency since employees have different economic interests than the REITs, 
leading to an agency problem. The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 permitted REITs to operate 
and manage most commercial properties. Legislation in 1993 removed the restriction on 
pension plan REIT investment. The REIT Simplification Act o f 1997 further simplified 
their operations. Finally, the REIT Modernization Act (RMA) was also designed to 
improve REITs’ efficiency. One o f the most important RMA features is to scale down the 
dividend requirement to 90%, providing a valuable source o f income to make payments 
on outstanding debt. Such regulatory changes appear necessary to strengthen the REITs’ 
structure to better serve investors and the economy. Since 1990, REITs have grown from 
a market capitalization o f approximately $9 billion to over SI39 billion. During 1997, 
REITs raised over $45 billion in security offerings, reflecting investor recognition o f 
growth prospects.
The literature lacks a detailed study o f REITs’ total factor productivity change 
although they do exist in a dynamic environment. This study investigates REITs’ 
performance by assessing technological progress, efficiency change, and productivity 
growth. The motivation for this study is the debate on the productivity and a need for 
empirical evidence that can help policy formulations.
Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue that estimation over a longer time period is 
needed to detect any improvement in performance after regulatory changes. This claim 
has not been tested. The first contribution o f this study is to employ a long chain o f  ex­
post performance indexes. Second, this study assesses the REIT total factor productivity 
change for the last decade by employing the DEA-type Malmquist Index. Third, the study 
examines possible efficiency change sources, such as pure technical efficiency change 
(change in managerial efficiency) and scale efficiency change (change in optimal size).
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This study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some REIT background 
information and discusses the regulatory landscape. Section 3 outlines the methodology 
used. Section 4 discusses data and input-output variables used in the analysis. Section 5 
reports the results. Section 6 provides conclusions.
3.2 Background
Congress created Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in 1960 to enable small 
investors to make investments in diversified, large-scale, income-producing real estate 
enterprises. REITs are closed-end investment companies that pool the funds of 
individuals and companies and, much like mutual funds, provide diversified portfolios by 
investing in real estate, mortgages, or real estate company shares. The difference between 
closed-end investment companies and mutual funds is in their approach. A REIT, as a 
closed-end investment company, has a fixed quantity o f  shares outstanding at any given 
time, most o f  which are traded on the financial market.
Congress has refined and improved the REIT laws, most notably in 1976, 1986, 
1993, 1997, and 1999, to ensure that REITs can continue to effectively fulfill their 
mission in a changing economic and business environment, helping shift the focus o f real 
estate investment from the tax-loss orientation of the 1970s and 1980s to the current 
taxable, income-oriented REIT environment. Such regulatory changes appear necessary 
to strengthen the REIT structure to better serve investors and the economy.
In 1960, REITs faced the same rules that were then governing regulated 
investment companies, known as mutual funds, and they had to distribute 90% of their 
taxable income to shareholders. This requirement was increased to 95%. Since these 
REIT dividends are mandatory and fully taxable to the shareholders, the tax burden is
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shifted from the company to the shareholders. Until 1986, REITs could own the 
properties, but were required by Federal law to hire managers or third parties to operate 
and manage them. REITs were focusing on construction and development rather than on 
developing long-term income generating properties. The Tax Reform Act o f 1986 made 
fundamental changes in the REIT’s operating structure by reducing the deductibility of 
interest, lengthening depreciation periods, restricting the use o f passive losses, and 
allowing REITs to operate and manage their own properties. The last provision is 
particularly important to the industry to the extent that Lemieux and Decker (1999) and 
Ambrose and Linneman (1998), among the others, redefine REITs as “old” or “new.” Old 
REITs still retain an outside advisor or property manager, operating as passive real estate 
investment vehicles (externally-managed REITs), which concentrate on developing 
properties for sale. On the other hand, new REITs are fully integrated operating 
companies, actively engaged in holding and managing their properties (self-advised/self­
managed REITs).
Regulatory changes continued in the 1990s. One key difference between the 
REITs o f the 1980s and those o f  the 1990s was the innovation o f the “umbrella 
partnership REIT” (UPREIT) structure, starting in 19921. This new form of REIT was 
created to address potential taxes related to the formation o f  a REIT when various 
partnerships owning multiple properties were involved. An UPREIT combines a 
partnership with a traditional REIT. The structure enables real estate partnerships to 
obtain liquidity, raise equity capital, and defer tax liabilities (Kleiman, 1993, Ambrose
1 In the typical UPREIT, the partners o f the Existing Partnership and the newly formed REIT become 
partners in a new partnership, termed the Operating Partnership. For their respective interests in the 
Operating Partnership (Units), the partners contribute the cash proceeds from the public offering. The REIT 
typically is the general partner and majority owner of the Operating Partnership Units (Source: 
www.nareit.com).
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and Linneman, 1998). Property owners interested in taking their real estate operations 
public can do so without incurring prohibitive capital gains taxes that have typically 
resulted from such transactions in the past (Crain et al., 2000). The REIT benefits by 
being able to acquire additional assets without having to immediately tap into the capital 
markets. This structure has been very popular in attracting capital, and more than 75% of 
new REITs have taken this form since 1992.
Another important regulatory change in the 1990s was the modification o f  the 
“five or fewer” rule. This rule disqualifies the REIT status if five or fewer shareholders 
hold more than 50% o f  its shares. Although this test is appropriate for the objective o f 
promoting REIT ownership among small investors, it is implausible for institutional 
investors to invest substantial sums in the shares o f  individual REITs. For example, 
pension funds were regarded as a single individual shareholder and could not invest 
significantly in individual REITs with relatively small market capitalization. The 
Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1993 alleviated this problem, allowing an institutional 
beneficiary to be considered an individual REIT shareholder. It was expected that 
passage of the Act would encourage institutions to increase their investment activity in 
REIT securities and enhance the depth o f available REIT capital. Consistent with this 
expectation, Chan et al. (1998) found an increase in institutional REIT securities 
ownership.
The Real Estate Investment Trust Simplification Act of 1997 (REITSA) 
simplified the day-to-day operations o f REITs, modernized some of the regulatory 
structure under the previous tax regime and assisted the continued growth o f  the industry. 
Under the old law, income from customary tenant services had been considered rent for
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the purpose o f both the 95% and 75% gross income test2. However, if non-customary 
services were given to tenants, income including the underlying rent payments did not 
qualify as income for these tests. Hence, REITs had to employ independent contractors to 
provide non-customary services to their tenants without having control over the quality o f 
services. REITSA provides a de minimis exception to prior law that rents are not 
“tainted” with respect to a property, so long as the REIT does not perform nonpermissible 
services generating 1% o f that property’s gross income. Thus, providing new services to 
tenants has three equally compelling benefits. First, new service generates greater loyalty 
and allows the REIT landlord to remain competitive. Second, it also generates a new 
stream o f income. Finally, the REIT can maintain better quality control over the services 
rendered to its tenants (NAREIT).
REITSA also repealed the 30% gross income test, which gave small REITs the 
opportunity to make large profits when they wanted to purchase a property or a package 
o f  properties held less than four years3. Furthermore, REITs were given permission to 
retain and pay income tax on net long-term capital gains instead o f paying a “capital gain 
dividend” to their shareholders. This strategy is the least expensive way to promote 
growth. Finally, REITSA made a technical change in profit calculation for the purpose o f  
assisting newly established REITs. REITs had to distribute all pre-REIT earnings and 
profits within the first taxable year or lose their status. However, new REITs could fail to 
comply with this requirement due to unexpected year-end earnings. The REITSA 
corrected the ordering rules for accumulated earning and profit distributions, eliminating 
a substantial risk for new REITs.
2 REITs must pay dividends o f  at least 95% o f REIT taxable income, and at least 75% of their gross income 
must be derived from cents horn real property or interest on mortgages on real estate property.
3 REIT looses its status in any year if  at least 30% of its gross income is derived from sales o f dealer 
property, real estate is held for less than four years, or securities are held for less than one year.
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The REIT Modernization Act (RMA), which became effective in 2001, creates a 
more competitive environment and promotes further efficiency. Among the most 
important provisions is the one about taxable REIT subsidiaries and distribution 
requirements. The previous legislation had permitted a REIT to earn up to 5% o f its 
income from sources other than rents, capital gains, dividends, and interest. To obtain 
part o f this income, many REITs have invested in non-REIT C corporations, which 
provide services not allowed to be offered by a REIT. Furthermore, REITs have invested 
in nonvoting securities of C corporations, the voting stock o f which is controlled by other 
persons (Third Party Subsidiary, or TPS), because they had to comply with the 
diversification tests4. The TPS structure is economically important because it has 
allowed REITs to use their assets and expertise to provide real estate related services to 
non-tenants. However, REITs are not allowed to control the subsidiary because of their 
diversification tests. REIT shareholders cannot be assured that the TPS will always act in 
their best interests. Income from TPS will accrue to the voting shareholders’ benefit, 
rather than the REIT shareholders (NAREIT). With RMA, REITs will be able to own up 
to 100% of the stock of a REIT subsidiary that can provide services to REIT tenants 
without disqualifying the rent received. Additionally, the REIT distribution requirement 
is reduced to 90% from 95%, providing a valuable source of income to make payments 
on outstanding debt.
In summary, REITs are required to comply with the following provisions:
I . A REIT must be a corporation, business trust or similar association, and be 
managed by a board o f directors or trustees;
4 REITs cannot own more than 10% o f the voting securities o f another company, and the securities of 
another company cannot exceed 5% o f a REIT’s total asset value.
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2. REITs must invest at least 75% o f their assets in real estate equities, 
mortgages, or government equities;
3. They must pay dividends o f  at least 90% o f their taxable income;
4. At least 75% of gross income must be derived from real property rents or real 
estate mortgage interest;
5. There must be a minimum o f one hundred shares which are fully transferable;
6. During the last half o f  each taxable year, REITs must have no more than 50% 
o f the shares held by five or fewer individuals;
7. The trustees, directors, and employees o f a REIT are restricted from actively 
managing or operating REIT property. However, they are permitted to make 
property decisions related to the business o f the REIT.
3.3 Methodology
Three accepted productivity change indexes appear in the literature: the Tomqvist 
index (Tomqvist, 1936), the Fisher Ideal Index (Fisher, 1922), and the Malmquist index 
(Malmquist, 1953). The Tomqvist and the Fisher Ideal Indexes can be calculated directly 
from price and quantity data; hence, no need exists to construct the underlying best 
practice production frontier by using linear programming technique or stochastic 
approaches to estimate the parameters o f functions characterizing the frontier. These 
indexes are also consistent with the flexible representations o f the frontier, i.e., both are 
superlative indexes (Caves et al., 1982; Diewert, 1992). The popularity of the Malmquist 
index stems from three advantages over the Tomqvist and the Fisher Ideal Index. First, it 
is calculated from quantity data only, a distinct advantage if  price information is not 
available. Second, it does not rest on restrictive behavioral assumptions because it doesn’t
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assume cost minimizing or profit maximizing behavior. Finally, the Malmquist index has 
an informational advantage over the others in the sense that it offers insight into the 
sources o f productivity change, providing a decomposition o f  productivity change into 
technological change and technical efficiency change5. However, the Tomqvist index 
presumes that production is always efficient and does not allow for the decomposition o f 
productivity growth into changes in technical efficiency and changes in technology. 
Consequently, the Malmquist index is employed for the analysis o f  productivity change.
Sten Malmquist, a Swedish economist and statistician, pioneered the construction 
o f quantity indexes as ratios of distance functions (Malmquist, 1953). In his consumer 
analysis, Malmquist compares two consumption bundles observed in different time 
intervals using input distance functions. Caves, Christensen and Diewer (1982a,b) 
(hereafter, CCD) utilize the same idea in production analysis, exploiting the Shephard 
concept o f distance function. They also show that under certain conditions, the Tomqvist 
index is equivalent to the geometric mean o f  two Malmquist output productivity indexes. 
However, Fare et al. (1985) define the Malmquist index by showing the relationship 
between distance functions and Farrel’s (1957) technical efficiency measures.
Following Farrel’s (1957) distance functions, Fare et al. (1994) defines an output-
based Malmquist index of productivity change. Let , r ' = (x [,...,x^ ) and
y ' = e  /?;w denote an input vector and an output vector o f REITs in the time
period t = 1,...,7*. The production function Sf models the transformation of inputs into 
outputs, i.e., the technology consists o f all feasible combinations o f input/output vectors.
5 Under certain conditions the Malmquist and Tomqvist indexes coincide (Caves et al., 1982), and under 
generally more restrictive conditions, the Malmquist and Fisher Ideal indexes coincide (Fare and 
Grosskopf, 1994).
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S ' = {(x' ,y '):x 'ca n  produce y '}  (1)
S' is assumed to satisfy certain axioms to define meaningful output distance functions 
[see Shephard, 1970]. Shephard (1970) defines the output distance function at t as
D'0{ x ',y ')  = inf{ft(.r', /  10) e S '} . (2)
In an output distance function, the aim is to maximize the proportional expansion o f the 
output vector for a given input vector. To determine the Malmquist index, the distance 
function is defined with respect to different time periods such as
V o t f "  ,y '"  ) = inf {ft (x'*1 / 6) e  S ' " }. (3)
This distance function measures the maximal proportional change in outputs to make 
(x'+‘, y'*') feasible in relation to the technology S', i.e., an observed input-output vector 
produced in the period t+1 is compared to the technology in the previous period /. In a
similar fashion, the distance function D '" (x ' , y ' )  measures the maximal proportional 
change in output required to make (x1, y )  feasible in relation to the technology at t+1.
Figure 7 illustrates these concepts. Assume that a REIT is observed in year / and 
t+1 with the combination o f (x\ y )  and (x'*‘, y t+/), which belong to the corresponding 
frontiers S' and S'+/. These observations can be either compared to the efficient point on 
the contemporaneous frontier or to the efficient point on the following year’s frontier. For 
example, the observation (x1, y ‘) is compared to (x ',y 't ) or ( x ' , y '^ ) ; whereas, the
observation (x!+i, y ,+l)  is compared to (.t '’1 , y '*\) or (x '"  , y ‘" ) .  The observations (x, y )  
and (x"‘, y +!)  are feasible but technically inefficient production points because they are 
interior to their own frontiers. However, the REIT at t+1, (x l"  , y ‘" ) produces more
output than the corresponding efficient REIT at t, (.t'~l ,y '+1) with the same level of 
input.
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y/fv
d = y ’
o . = y *
Figure 7. Illustration o f the Malmquist Output-Based Productivity Index 
CCD define the Malmquist productivity change index based on the reference 
technology with the period t and t+I as benchmarks,
<t„t+1 D '* '(x1*1 v'*1)
and M "' = 0 1 ,y  ’ (4)
D U x '.y ')  •
A / is obtained relative to the benchmark technology in period /; whereas, A /+/ is 
calculated relative to the benchmark technology in period t+1. Fare et al. (1994) specifies 
the Malmquist productivity change index as the geometric mean of these CCD-type 
Malmquist productivity indexes to preclude choosing an arbitrary benchmark, as follows:
M (x ,y  ,x l , y ‘) = Dq(x ‘*1 Z C C x '* ', /* ')
- 11/2
(5)D ‘(x ',y ')  D'*l{x ‘ , y l )
M  defines the productivity o f the production point (xt+l, y t+l)  with respect to the 
production point (.xl, y 'j according to both years’ technologies and calculates the 
geometric mean o f the two ratios. M  is greater than, equal to, or less than unity according
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
to how the REIT experiences productivity growth, stagnation, or productivity decline 
between the periods t and t+1.
Following Fare et. al. (1989, 1992), an equivalent way of stating the Malmquist 
output-based productivity index is
The Total Factor Productivity Change (TFPCH) index, M, is calculated as the 
product of efficiency change (EFFCH), reflecting how close a REIT is to the efficient 
frontier (catching-up effect) and technological change (TECHCH), reflecting how much 
the benchmark production frontier shifts at each REIT’s input mix (technical innovation 
or shock). Between periods t and t+1, EFFCH (TECHCH) attains a value o f greater than 
1, less than 1, or equal to zero, which reflects an efficiency increase (technical progress), 
efficiency decrease (technical regress), or no efficiency change (stagnation), 
respectively. These components may be moving in opposite directions; for example, a 
Malmquist index o f 1.25, which signals a productivity growth, could have an efficiency 
decrease (e.g., 0.5) and a technical progress (e.g., 2.5).
Calculation and decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index requires the
EFFCH TECHCH
In terms o f the distances along the y-axis, the index takes the following form,
(7)
□  ► ►►tS! ► ► M □  ► ► ► ►►fiJ ► ► ► ► M
TFPCH EFFCH TECHCH
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calculation o f  four-output distance functions for each REIT in each pair o f adjacent time 
periods. Following Fare et. al. (1994), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a linear 
programming (LP) technique, is employed to measure the productivity change under the 
assumption o f  a constant return to scale (CRS) technology, i.e., all REITs are scale
efficient. Assume that there are k  = 1,..., AT observations o f n - \ , . . . ,N  inputs x kJ in 
each period f = l,...,7 \ which are employed to produce k  -  \,...,K  observations of 
m = 1,..., M  outputs denoted in each period t = l,...,7 \ The technology is described 
in period t as follows:
S ' = < * : ,  n = \ ,...,N
4=1
<y'm, m = 1 M  (8)
4=1
K
<1; A.kJ > 0 , k  = 1,...,/T)
4=1
where AtJ is an intensity variable showing the degree o f intensity each REIT uses in the 
production. Intensity variables are restricted to sums of less than or equal to one. Relative 
to the component distance functions, four linear programming problems are solved for 
each REIT. These are as follows:
[D£ (**■',j'*-')]’ 1 = max0
subject to
£ A * 'x y  <*„*•', /i = l,...,JV (9)
4 = 1
m =  l  M
4 = 1
< 1; Ak'1 >  0, k =  l,...,K .
k = l
The computation of , y i ,+l) is exactly like (9), where t+1 is substituted for t.
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The third problem related to the function £>' (x k,*i , y k’1*1) is solved as follows:
= max0
subject to
Y i Ak’,x kS  Z x t J+l , n = l ,. . . ,N  (10)
4=1
f r ? "  m = M
4 = i 
K
£ a * ' < i ; Xk,t > 0, k = \,...,K .
* = i
The last linear programming problem is specified as in (10), but the t and t+1 superscripts 
are transposed.
Technical efficiency change is decomposed into scale efficiency and pure 
technical efficiency components (EFFCH — PEFFCH x  SCH). Decomposition requires 
the calculation o f  distance functions under variable returns to scale (VRS) (rather than 
CRS) technology by solving two additional LP problems, simply adding the convexity
K
restriction ^_tAkJ = 1. The efficiency change is constructed as the ratio of the own-period
4=1
distance functions in each period satisfying variable returns to scale. The technical 
change component is calculated relative to the constant returns to scale technology. Scale 
efficiency is calculated as the ratio o f the distance function satisfying constant returns to 
scale to the function satisfying variable returns to scale.
The Malmquist productivity index has been extensively used in the literature. In 
particular, it is employed to examine the impacts of deregulation and/or liberalization in 
industries. For example, an extensive body o f research exists in the banking literature. 
Berg et. al. (1992) study the productivity growth o f the Norwegian banking industry 
before and after deregulation over the years 1980-89. Both bank lending volume and the
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lending interest rates are strictly regulated prior to 1984. However, this regulation is 
gradually lifted from 1984 to 1988. The Malmquist productivity analysis reveals 
productivity regress in the pre-regulation years because of creating idle capacity with the 
advent o f deregulation. However, the Norwegian banking industry experiences rapid 
productivity growth in the post-deregulation era. The authors attribute this progress to 
utilization o f  capacity. A substantial improvement occurs in the relative efficiency of 
most banks. The results also reveal that productivity levels of banks become similar, 
implying increased competition during the deregulated era.
Tatje and Lovell (1996) measure the productivity changes in Spanish savings 
banks during the post-deregulation period 1986-1991. During this period, great size 
dispersion occurs among savings banks. W hile outputs grow from 45% to 90%, inputs 
grow from 67% to 176%. Hence, this changing environment causes operating problems 
for savings bank managements, but it also creates opportunities for growth. Two features, 
particularly after 1989, dominate the savings bank segment of the industry: branching and 
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Results from the Malmquist index 
approach show a rapid decline in productivity throughout the period and vary within a 
narrow range o f  3.4%-5.5% per year because inputs have grown faster then outputs. They 
also find that branching does not affect productivity and that the effect o f consolidation is 
inconclusive.
Leightner and Lovell (1998) document the performance of Thai banks during the 
financial liberalization period 1989-1994. During this period, all interest rate ceilings are 
gradually removed. All current account foreign exchange and capital account restrictions 
are relaxed, resulting in a 59% decrease in the spread between commercial bank average 
lending rates and deposit rates. In contrast, the effective spread between commercial
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banks’ lending rates and their cost o f funds increases from 2.87% to 3.22% because of 
the lower cost of funds tapped from foreign sources. The Thai Securities and Exchange 
Commission is established, and commercial banks are allowed to underwrite and arrange 
for debt instruments. Thailand’s liberalization process also includes the relaxation of 
certain portfolio restrictions. Banks are no longer required to hold government securities 
in their portfolio. The authors find a productivity decline for Thai banks but productivity 
increases for foreign banks. They conclude that deregulation leads to increased 
competition, higher profits, and economic growth.
Wheelock and Wilson (1999) examine U.S. commercial banks for the period 
1984-1993. They find that productivity declines on average but not nearly to the extent o f 
the decline in efficiency. Although U.S. commercial banks experience technological 
progress, it is not enough to offset the increases in technical and scale inefficiency during 
1984-1993. Results further reveal that regulatory changes have different effects on 
various-sized firms. Small banks experience larger declines in productivity in the first 
half o f the study period, with large banks showing larger declines in the second half.
Avkiran (2000) examines the changes in productivity o f the retail-banking sector 
(four major Australian trading banks and six regional banks) in the deregulated period 
1986-1995, using the Malmquist productivity index. Deregulation o f the Australian 
finance sector includes lifting o f deposit controls, authorization of savings banks to 
provide checking facilities, invitation o f foreign banks to operate in Australia, and 
expansion of services by credit unions and building societies. The banks respond to 
increased competition through such practices, generating revenue from fees rather than 
from the interest spread, product innovation, or new delivery channels. Findings indicate 
an overall rise in total productivity (on average, 3.2% per year) driven more by
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technological progress than technical efficiency. Technological innovation reflects the 
efficiency gains where banks take advantage o f new cost-effective technologies and 
pursue product and market development.
3.4 Data
Data on productivity and efficiency analysis come from the SNL REIT Quarterly 
for the years 1989 through 1999, with a total o f 1671 observations from 280 equity 
REITs. This data set represents a comprehensive set o f  equity REITs with the necessary 
input and output variables. Many observations (296) have been dropped due to missing 
information6. The final data set is comprised o f 1375 observations from 235 equity REITs 
over an eleven-year study period.
REITs have become a major source o f funding for the real estate industry. The 
distribution o f  equity REITs and security offerings for all REITs across the years is 
shown in Chapter 2, Table 1. A large number of initial public offerings took place in 
1993 and 1994, representing the formation of new REITs. There were 191 REITs formed 
between 1989 and 1999, and 95 o f these were formed in 1993 and 1994. The capital 
raised from initial public offerings was about SI6.5 billion in these two years, which was 
about 53% o f the entire period. Total equity capitalization increased from Sll billion at 
the end o f 1992 to S26 billion in 1993. This rapid growth continued during 1994 with an 
increase o f more than S38 billion. After 1994, the focus shifted to secondary offerings, 
with more than 57 billion raised in 1995, S ll  billion in 1996, S26 billion in 1997, and 
S19 billion during 1998. The number o f offerings increased from 52 in 1994 to 297 in
6 For instance, input prices for some REITs could not be determined because correspondent input values 
were reported as zero.
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1998. This growth resulted in a market o f 167 equity REITs with a total market 
capitalization o f more than SI 18 billion.
The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) classifies 
three types o f REITs, according to their respective holdings o f  real property or mortgage 
instruments, namely: equity, mortgage, and hybrid REITs. To be classified as an equity 
(mortgage) REIT, at least 75% of the REIT investment portfolio must consist o f income 
producing real property (mortgage instruments). Hybrid REITs combine the activities o f 
equity and mortgage REITs.
This study focuses on equity REITs for two main reasons. First, firms included in 
the sample should be relatively homogeneous and operate in similar market and 
regulatory conditions (Oral and Yolalan, 1990). Equity, mortgage, and hybrid REIT firms 
are totally separate because their managerial goals are different. While rent is the most 
important source o f income for equity REITs, interest is the primary income for mortgage 
REITs. Additionally, fluctuations in macroeconomic variables (e.g., interest rates) affect 
operating strategies mostly for mortgage REITs’.
Second, operating under various market conditions could influence the efficiency 
and performance measures if  different REIT forms are pooled in the same sample. Aly et 
al. (1990) suggest constructing different frontiers for each type o f  firm to measure the 
efficiencies. In order to pool all firms into a common frontier, differences in mean 
efficiencies arising from separate frontiers should be insignificant across firms. This 
finding will allow determination of whether the groups could be pooled and used for the 
same frontier based on efficiency distributions. However, a few observations of mortgage 
and hybrid REITs for most years do not allow the construction o f different frontiers 
because efficiency measures could be upwardly biased.
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3.4.1 Input and Output Variables
No consensus exists among researchers, theoretical or otherwise, about what 
constitutes REIT production or how best to measure output. Possible suggestions include 
assets, dividends or funds from operations (FFO), market capitalization (or market 
capitalization less debt), and space measures (square footage, number o f units, etc.)7. 
Considering output measures from other efficiency analyses, and following the premise 
o f REIT efficiency studies (Bers and Springer, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, and Anderson et al., 
1999), total assets are selected as an output measure. Furthermore, Springer (1998) finds 
that total assets have a high correlation with market capitalization; it has lower variance 
and yields more consistent results, and any bias is conservative compared to other 
alternative output choices.
REIT output is generally in three categories. Loans (L) are the value o f all real 
estate loans; properties (P) are properties in operation owned by the company; and other 
assets (OA) are non-operational properties8, unconsolidated partnerships (value o f joint 
ventures), and all non-real estate investment assets. These particular outputs are 
meaningful for the efficiency analysis because income (rent and/or interest) from them 
depends on management’s investment decisions (whether to buy real estate or give 
loans). Two REIT input measures emerge naturally from the SNL dataset. These are 
interest expenses (IE) and property-operating expenses (POE). Interest expense is the cost 
o f debt and other borrowings, including the amortization of debt discounts. Property- 
operating expense is the cost associated with rental properties, including maintenance,
7 For a detailed discussion as to whether REITs are an equity (stock) investment or whether they are a real 
estate investment and for justification o f possible REIT outputs, see Springer (1998).
* Non-operational properties include properties under development, land held for development, and 
property held for sale. Other assets also include unconsolidated partnerships, which are the value o f joint 
ventures and all non-real estate investment assets.
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utilities, property management fees, and real estate taxes.
Table 2 in Chapter 2 reports summary statistics for outputs and inputs o f  the 
REITs for the years 1989 through 1999. Loan production has a U-shaped pattern, 
declining from $18 million in 1989 to the lowest level o f  $3 million in 1993 and then 
increasing to $25 million in 1999. However, properties steadily increase over the period 
and dominate loans by at least a factor of 7 in 1989 and at most a factor of 78 in 1993. 
This pattern is mainly because o f the interest rate, declining from 7.91% in 1989 to the 
lowest level of 3.33% in 1993. In this period, REITs preferred purchasing property by 
using less expensive funds to making loans with low interest rates. Therefore, as is shown 
in Table 2, REIT interest expenses doubled between 1991 and 1993.
3.5 Regulation Impact on Productivity Growth of REITs
In this section, the study analyzes the performance o f REITs over an 11-year 
(1989-1999) regulation period. In such a different period setting, the Malmquist total 
productivity change indexes and its components must include a technology year of 
reference (base year). The results shown in Table 8 relate to both a fixed reference 
technology and a changing reference technology. In the case of fixed reference 
technology, 1989 is used as a reference year when calculating the productivity and 
efficiency change during the period because the primary goal is to examine the industry 
performance after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Since a relatively long period is needed 
to bring about a material impact on REITs technology from the regulatory environment, 3 
years after the Act is assumed to be adequate to capture any structural change in REITs’ 
performance. Moreover, no significant development or event occurred in 1989, so it can
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Table 8. Average Total Factor Productivity Change in REITs 
During the Period 1989-1999
Panel A: W ith respect to fixed reference frontier
Period # o f obs. effch tecch pefch sech tfpch
89-90 35 1.090 0.757 0.887 1228 0.825
89-91 31 1.123 0.790 0.927 1211 0.887
89-92 30 1.223 0.731 0.946 1.293 0.894
89-93 27 1.237 0.726 0.920 1.345 0.898
89-94 30 1.304 0.486 0.974 1.339 0.634
89-95 24 1.378 0.422 0.970 1.420 0.581
89-96 25 1.408 0.433 1.010 1294 0.609
89-97 20 1.055 0.654 0.991 1.065 0.690
89-98 17 1.092 0.558 0.963 1.134 0.609
89-99 15 0.929 0.777 0.863 1.076 0.721
Mean
89-93 1.168 0.751 0.920 1.269 0.876
94-97 1.286 0.499 0.986 1205 0.629
98-99 1.011 0.668 0.913 1.105 0.665
89-99 1.184 0.633 0.945 1.251 0.735
Panel B: W ith respect to changing frontier
Period # o f  obs. effch tecch pefch sech tfpch
89-90 35 1.09 0.757 0.887 1.228 0.825
90-91 40 1.01 0.917 1.062 0.951 0.926
91-92 69 0.446 2.359 0.956 0.467 1.053
92-93 87 1.571 0.757 1.111 1.413 1.189
93-94 93 5.386 0.211 1.164 4.626 1.138
94-95 151 1.559 0.496 1.111 1.403 0.773
95-96 171 1.485 0.695 1.006 1.476 1.033
96-97 154 1.027 1.117 0.849 1.21 1.147
97-98 143 2.37 0.358 1.525 1.554 0.847
98-99 132 1.432 0.619 1.202 1.191 0.887
Mean
89-93 0.937 1.055 1.000 0.937 0.989
94-97 1.892 0.534 1.025 1.845 1.010
98-99 1.842 0.471 1.354 1.360 0.867
89-99 1.421 0.684 1.073 1.324 0.972
Effch: Efficiency change; Tecch: Technical (technological) change; Pefch: Pure technical efficiency 
change; Sech: Scale efficiency change; Tfpch: Total productivity change.
safely serve as a control year9.
9 Isik and Hassan (2001) assume that a 4-year interval is appropriate to capture any structural change in the 
performance o f Turkish banks.
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Table 8 presents the mean annual values o f  the Malmquist total factor 
productivity change {tfpch) index with its two mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
components, changes in technical efficiency {effch) and shifts in technology {tecch) over 
time. The two distinct components o f the technical efficiency change, pure technical 
efficiency change {pefch) and scale efficiency change {sech) are also reported.
3.5.1 Productivity Growth Relative to Fixed Reference Technology
The reference frontier is fixed in 1989 and compared to the years from 1990 to 
1999 in the input-output space. The main issue is what the productivity levels are in 
1990, 1991, 1992 etc., relative to the 1989 base year. The study examines the same REIT 
firms throughout the years.
Results in Table 8, Panel A suggest that REITs have experienced increases in 
efficiency (except in 1999) but decreases in productivity growth and technological 
regress for all years examined. A dominant source o f efficiency improvements is scale 
efficiency. Pure technical efficiency change is negative over the period (except for 1996). 
Although productivity deteriorated, it has gradually approached the base year level during 
the period o f 1989-1993. In the following year (1994), the REIT industry faced a 
significant shock, as reflected in a 33% reduction in the technology index, which turns 
into a 30% regress in productivity. On the other hand, REITs continued to experience 
increases in efficiency after 1994. This finding suggests that a significant number o f new 
entrances to the market caused decline from the frontier but helped REITs operate more 
efficiently because o f  increasing competition10.
Results further reveal that REITs maintained their efficiency increase between
10 Of particular interest is the large number o f IPOs in 1993 and 1994. There is a 52% and 30% increase in 
equity REITs in these two years.
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1994 and 1996. However, they were still suffering from technological regress in that 
period. The REIT industry seemed to have another shock in 1997. It had a positive 
impact on technological improvement (an increase o f  50%) but a negative impact on the 
efficiency (a decrease o f 25%). Yet, the technological increase was not enough to make 
the productivity positive.
In the aggregate, relative to the reference year 1989, the average REIT 
experiences productivity loss in the periods o f 1989-1993 (12%), 1994-1997 (37%), and 
1998-1999 (34%). The breakdown o f  total factor productivity change {tfpch) into its 
components suggests that the source o f productivity loss is a regress in technology 
{tecch), rather than a decrease in efficiency {effch). In fact, efficiency increases in all 
periods o f 17%, 28%, and 1% are due to improvements in scale efficiencies. Overall, in 
the period 1989-1999, REITs suffered a productivity decline resulting from a regress in 
technological improvement.
3.5.2 Productivity Growth Relative to Successive Reference Technolo2v
Basically, two problems exist in studying productivity growth relative to a fixed 
reference technology. First, the base year does not necessarily represent the industry 
itself. The study requires the use o f  the same REITs each year when comparing the 
productivity o f the industry. However, it is difficult to hold to this requirement because 
the number o f firms in the industry changes over time due to new entries and exits. 
Second, a limited number of firms and their performance in the base year (1989) obscure 
the absolute levels o f productivity and its components (Isik and Hassan, 2001). However, 
successive year technology accounts for a possible survivorship bias and includes more 
observations from the industry. Table 8, Panel B reports the geometric means of the 
annual productivity change index and its components.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
The results suggest that REITs experience productivity growth in the periods 
1992-1994 and 1996-1997. Actually, the growth trend starts in 1990, improving by 5% 
for 1992, and reaching a maximum level in 1993 o f 19%. In these years, except for 1992, 
even though technological change exerts a counterbalancing effect on productivity, an 
enhancement in efficiency offsets this negative impact and causes productivity growth. 
Throughout the period, productivity follows the same pattern as discussed in the fixed 
reference technology. REITs generally suffer from technological deterioration during the 
period.
Results from this analysis show that the technology index is not stable during the 
entire period. However, the pattern o f  technology change, as well as the change in 
efficiency, is similar to the outcomes obtained from the fixed reference frontier. While 
the REIT efficiency increases about 243% in 1994 compared to 1993, its technological 
status worsens by 72% in the same year. Hence, the results from the successive reference 
technology also prove that new entries in the market made the industry operate more 
efficiently. In 1997, they experience another shock, but in the opposite direction, i.e., 
their efficiency decreases by 31% but they technologically improve by 61%.
In the aggregate, with respect to successive reference technology, the average 
REIT experiences productivity loss in the periods o f 1989-1993 (1%) and 1998-1999 
(13%), but gain in 1994-1997 (34%). After 1993, the source o f productivity loss is a 
regress in technology {tecch) rather than a decrease in efficiency {effch). Overall, in the 
period 1989-1999, REITs suffered a productivity decline resulting from a regress in 
technological improvement.
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3.53  Implications for Investors and Regulators
Deregulation is generally undertaken to improve an industry’s performance and 
efficiency. The improvement in resource allocation should benefit society. Price 
reductions and better services for consumers are also expected if  competition is 
sufficient. Although the ultimate goal o f  deregulation has been to improve efficiency, the 
results from depository institutions have been mixed. For example, Berg, Forsund, and 
Jansen (1992) reports improved efficiency and productivity after deregulation, as do Shyu 
(1998) for Taiwanese banks, Leightner and Lovell (1998) for Thai banks, and Isik and 
Hassan (2001) for Turkish banks in a more liberalized financial environment. While U.S. 
banking efficiency has remained relatively unchanged after the deregulation of the early 
1980s (Bauer et. al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995), the productivity declines 
during the post-deregulation era (Humphrey, 1993; Grabowski et. al. 1994; Humphrey 
and Pulley, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 1999).
In some cases, regulatory changes lead to a reduction in measured productivity 
depending on the industry-type market conditions (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). For 
instance, Lozano (1995) reports that Spanish banks do not produce the maximum 
possible output vector due to intense competition for market share following 
deregulation. Following the interest rate deregulation in the 1980s, great competition 
arises among U.S. banks in terms of paying higher interest rates on consumer deposits. 
The productivity benefits that could have been captured by banks are instead passed on to 
customers because no corresponding reduction occurs in banking services (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997).
Starting in I960, investors have realized the benefits o f real estate investments by 
REIT regulation. Commercial real estate investment has become a viable option for all
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REIT regulation. Commercial real estate investment has become a viable option for all 
investors because it is an excellent hedge against inflation. Furthermore, REITs eliminate 
the lack o f diversification problem and many o f  the costs and risks associated with real 
estate because it is now possible for small investors to purchase a diversified collection of 
illiquid real estate selected and managed by the professional management in the form of a 
marketable security. For REITs, an incentive to maximize operating performance also 
exists, which, in turn, benefits investors due to utilizing resources more efficiently.
In the last decade, changing real estate industry-type market structure resulted 
from regulatory changes, increasing REIT population and market capitalization have 
affected REITs’ productivity. Examining productivity using different reference 
technologies gives some clues about determining the effects o f new dynamic 
environment and regulatory changes. Figure 8 shows the REITs’ productivity measures 
from both fixed and successive reference technologies. Although corresponding measures 
follow the same pattern, their values differ from each other. It is limited to capture all 
market changes with fixed reference technology due to using only the base year (1989) 
firms. Much more volatility in the successive reference technology reflects sharp and 
dramatic changes in the industry because o f  regulatory changes and new entries to the 
market. For instance, although REITs suffer from productivity loss for the entire period 
employing the fixed reference technology, they experience productivity gain for five 
years (1992-1994 and 1996-1997) using the successive reference technology. The 
productivity trend generally shows that regulatory changes in 1986 and 1993 have a 
positive impact on the industry.
Efficiency change appears to be positive for both frontier technologies. However, 
REITs do not have increase in pure technical efficiency change during the period using
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the fixed reference technology. Using the successive reference technology, REITs 
experience more increase in efficiency change and, more importantly, increase in pure 
technical efficiency change (Figure 9). Moreover, sources o f  increase in efficiency 
change are generally both scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency change. These 
findings further imply that investors get benefits from the corresponding regulatory 
changes and new entries during the period, resulting in competition among REITs, which 
turns into managerial efficiency.
Although REITs’ efficiency increases relative to their frontier, they experience 
technical (technological) regress in the last decade. Actually, technical regress is the main 
reason for overall 3% productivity loss. The dividend requirement on REITs might 
explain the technical regress. The dividend requirement prevents REITs from maintaining 
current properties and funding future growth. Because REITs are required to pay out 90% 
o f their income to shareholders, they cannot reinvest their earnings. Since REITs have 
insufficient retained earnings, managers have to look for capital outside of the firm. 
Raising equity and debt are more costly than using retained earnings. Productivity loss in 
the last decade might be attributed to the industry’s higher cost o f  capital. In the 1990s, 
REITs raised equity as a principle source o f capital. Their debt ratio also significantly 
increased after 1992. While their unsecured debt was SI.3 billion, it increased to S10.5 
billion in 1997, making the industry more risky (NAREIT).
In sum, reshaping the regulatory framework in light o f recent developments has 
been a major concern for policymakers and for REIT managers. The patterns of 
productivity, efficiency, and technological change seem consistent with what one might 
expect o f an industry living in a dynamic environment. Results suggest that the existing 
regulatory framework is costly and imposing productivity loss. Removing restrictions
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upon dividends might provide more flexibility and stability for the real estate market.
3.6 Conclusion
This study investigates the impact o f regulatory changes, which started in 1986 
and continued during the last decade, on the productivity, efficiency, and technology of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) by means o f  the DEA-type Malmquist Total 
Factor Productivity Change Index approach. The productivity change is examined 
relative to the fixed reference technology and to the successive reference technology.
The results suggest that the efficiency o f  REITs increases during the period of 
1989-1999; whereas, their productivity generally decreases because of technical regress. 
This finding implies that REITs have exerted substantial efforts to gain efficiency rather 
than improve technically. However, this implication would not be enough to offset the 
negative impact of technical regress on their productivity.
REITs operate in a highly regulated environment and continuously face dynamic 
changes in their structure and market. REIT managers should be highly skillful in their 
decision-making to overcome the difficulties resulting from environmental changes. It 
seems that recorded efficiency increases are mainly due to both scale efficiencies and to 
better management practices as reflected in pure efficiency changes. Technological 
regress, particularly after 1993, can be attributed to higher cost of capital because of 
increasing capital raised.
Overall, structural and regulatory changes have affected REIT’s productivity in 
different ways. More efficiency and technical improvement could be achieved by 
appropriate regulations. REITs typically raise debt to finance new property acquisition, 
using unsecured corporate lines o f credit. Lenders generally expect to be repaid from 
proceeds of equity and focus on REIT’s access to the capital markets and on the ability to
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raise equity capital. In this case, the results reveal technical regress leading to 
productivity loss. In order to reduce such inefficiencies, the dividend requirements could 
be further reduced to enhance REITs’ after-tax income and enable REITs to use retained 
earnings on investments and make payments on outstanding debt.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has examined the evidence concerning the efficiency and productivity 
o f equity REITs from 1989 to 1999. Data Envelopment Analysis was employed to 
measure the cost, allocative, technical, pure technical, and scale efficiencies o f firms. 
Alternative (nonstandard) profit efficiency was also measured using the Stochastic 
(Economic) Frontier Approach. The average cost and profit efficiencies for the REITs are 
14% and 27%, respectively, implying that most REIT resources and potential profits are 
wasted during REIT operations. Overall inefficiency can be attributed to underutilization 
or wasting o f inputs rather than choosing the incorrect input mix, because cost 
inefficiency is mostly caused by technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency.
Low technical efficiency implies not only “poor management” in terms of 
utilizing inputs but also scale inefficiency because o f operating at incorrect scale. REITs 
have increasingly experienced diseconomies o f scale in which the majority (94%) are 
large. This implies the importance o f  optimum size for the REIT industry because it 
incurs greater operational costs because o f scale inefficiency, which seems to be related 
more to being a greater, not lesser, size than optimal. The result o f  a negative (positive) 
relationship between large (small and medium) REITs and scale efficiency is further 
evidence o f  an industry-wide tendency to go beyond the optimal size limit.
88
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Several conclusions emerge from the second stage regression analysis. First, growth rate 
in REITs1 assets impacts positively on efficiency measures suggesting that REITs utilize 
the fixed administrative and overhead expenses, and employ experienced management 
teams concentrating on properties in the real estate industry. Second, good capitalization 
and higher loan production make the REITs more efficient. Third, REIT efficiency 
decreases with higher debt because the cost o f  low leverage REIT debt is less than that o f 
high leverage REITs. In addition, large REITs with more market power experience 
significantly lower scale, technical, and cost efficiencies. Finally, the results indicate that 
CEO-Chairman affiliated firms are generally negatively related to input efficiencies, 
thereby supporting the agency cost theory.
A DEA-type Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change Index approach was 
employed to measure the REITs’ productivity over the period 1989-1999. Overall, 
structural and regulatory changes have affected REITs’ productivity in different ways. 
Although REITs’ efficiency increased relative to their frontier, they experienced 
technical (technological) regress in the last decade, which was the main reason for their 
overall 3% productivity loss. More efficiency and technical improvement could be 
achieved by appropriate regulations.
Reshaping the regulatory framework in light o f recent developments has been a 
major concern for both policymakers and REIT managers. The different and volatile 
patterns o f productivity, efficiency, and technological change seem consistent with what 
one might expect o f an industry living in a dynamic environment. Results suggest that the 
existing regulatory framework is costly and imposes productivity loss. Removing 
restrictions upon dividends might provide both more flexibility and greater stability for
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the real estate market.There are several directions for further research in REIT operating 
efficiency. First, other than equity REITs, the efficiency o f hybrid REITs and mortgage 
REITs can also be examined. Second, ownership structure, such as institutional 
ownership, inside ownership, and beneficial ownership can be examined further to 
explain the variations o f  efficiency. Finally, further study can be conducted to investigate 
the post-merger performance o f REITs, which are engaged in acquisition.
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